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ABSTRACT
A system analysis of the Shuttle Orbiter Baseline
System Management (SM) computer function is performed. This
analysis results in an alternative SM design which is also
described. The alternative design exhibits several improve-
ments over the Baseline, some of which are increased crew
usability, improved flexibility and improved growth potential.
It was discovered that analysis results were restricted so
long as SM was regarded simply as a performance monitor. Not
until SM was treated as a crew management infromation system,
whose principal objective was to aid the crew, did analysis
findings become meaningful. The analysis consists of two
parts: an application assessment and an implementation
assessment. The former is concerned with the SM user needs
and design functional aspects. The latter is concerned with
design flexibility, reliability, growth potential and technical
risk.
The system analysis is supported by several topical
investigations. These include: treatment of false alarms,
treatment of off-line items, significant interface parameters
and a design evaluation checklist.
The most extensive supporting investigation consists
of an in depth formulation of techniques, concepts and guide-
lines for design of automated performance verification. The
formulation outlines the design process and covers criteria for
selecting functions for which verification is most effective,
identification of performance measures, system partitioning,
false alarm avoidance techniques, response time implications,
treatment of status indications and methods for measuring
performance. This formulation is supported by examples.
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CONCLUSIONS
a. Checking the status of functional paths - as opposed
to checking numerous parameters--is both feasible and
desirable. The feasibility is supported by Volume II
to this report and the desirability by Section 2.0,
et seq in this volume.
b. The Baseline SM Design is both feasible and technically
adequate. It can, however, be improved in the following
ways.
* Usability by the crew
* Credibility of SM decisions
* Adding functional path status checking
* Reduced C&W response time
* Increased flexibility and growth potential
This is supported by Sections 2.0 and 3.0 et seq.
c. Needs of the user were not adequately considered in the
design of SM. Taken in total context, SM is not just a
performance monitor. Rather, it is a crew management
information system. This is supported by Sections 2.0,
et seq. and 4.6.
d. Off-line items are probably best checked on a scheduled
basis (as opposed to attempted continuous checking) and
this check is most practically implemented by successively
switching them on line. This is supported by Section 4.2.
e. SM cold restarts are viable. This is supported by Section
4.4.
f. It is feasible, should the need arise, to implement all
scheduled SM functions on the ground provided TDRSS is
used. This is supported by Section 4.5.
g. The concepts and techniques of automated fault detection
.can be formulated into a design discipline. This is
supported by Volume II to this report.
h. The critical SM interface is the crew interface. This
is supported by Section 4.6.
i. The technology area of management information systems
and performance monitoring have not yet reached a stage
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Formal enough to warrant practical analytical cost/
performance prediction simulations. Analytical assess-
ment techniques are, however, realizable. This is
supported by Sections 4.7 and 4.8.
j. Precondition Steering does not affect the sample rate of
subsystem parameters, only the necessity that state in-
formation be sampled close to the parameter sample time.
This is supported by Section 4.3.
k. Step response is a universal performance measure for false
alarm avoidance techniques. For the avoidance method
used in the Baseline Design, its step response represents
the fastest response it can possibly have. This is
supported by Sections 2.2 and 4.1.
1. Failure to adequately consider the user apparently
originated with failure to perform an operations analysis.
This analysis should have been part of the RDD. In short,
a specification step was omitted. This is supported by
Section 2.4.
m. SM will require more than a performance monitoring
function. It will also require a performance verification
function, the distinction being that the latter not only
monitors but also verifies acceptability of performance.
This is supported by Section 2.2.
n. The alternative SM design developed in this study signi-
ficantly improves the crew's ability to manage Orbiter
resources and to effect positive action in recovery from
emergencies, In terms of design measures, crew workload
has been reduced, crew responsiveness (to unforeseen
circumstances) has been increased and autonomy has been
increased. To achieve these program improvements,
additional SM design efforts will be required. This is
supported by Sections 2.0, et seq. and 3.1. Particular
support for the SM role is contained in Section 2.2.3.
-viii-
RECOMMENDATIONS
a. In view of the time remaining until the First Opera-
tional Flight, the Baseline Design should be reassessed
considering the potential improvements resulting from
this study.
b. Consideration should be given to including a set of
nominal and a set of emergency parameter limits which
are crew-selectable.
c. Determination of parameter limits and smoothing constants
should not be a real time crew task. This should be done
by past-flight data analysis when all the facts are in.
d. A Functional Path Fault Detector should be included in SM.
e. A Status Table and Redundancy Table should be included
in SM.
f. The SM function of C&W should be functionally isolated
from the rest of SM.
g. Some SM tasks can be accomplished procedurally. A trade
study should be instituted which clearly identifies
procedural tasks and SM tasks.
h. Current precondition steering logic does not include a
NOT operator. Consideration should be given to adding-
this operator.
i. An SM operations analysis should be performed.
j. The topics for further study identified in Section 5.0
of this volume represent major areas to be fulfilled
before SM is committed to a final implementation. Each
should be undertaken.
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1.0 INTRODUCTION
This final report, prepared under Contract Number
NAS 9-13887, presents the results of an Orbiter System
Management Computer Function Study and was conducted by
Harris Electronic Systems Division, Melbourne, Florida.
The study has not only provided an SM system anal-
ysis and a discipline for designing performance verification
systems, but more importantly, an alternative SM design which
significantly improves the crew's ability to manage Orbiter
resources and respond to emergencies.
The System Management (SM) Computer Function is in-
tended to monitor the various Orbiter and Payload subsystems
and make these results available to the crew. The function
is implemented exclusively in software, extracting data from
the Operational Instrumentation System as well as GN&C.
While forms of performance monitoring have been
in existence for some time, application of this concept on a
real time basis across an entire sophisticated system is a
challenging task. Achieving a practical, credible imple-
mentation of this concept requires more than instrumentation
technology. It requires a totally different way of thinking.
Along these lines, one of the purposes of this study is to
provide a fresh, objective look at automated performance
verification.
It should be noted that this study evaluates the
Operational Version of SM rather than the current Approach
and LandingTest (ALT) Version. Four factors influenced
this decision.
* The Operational Version is far enough in
the future that study results would be
timely.
* The Operational Version will not be subject
to the schedule pressures and development
dynamics experienced by the Current Version.
* The Current Version is not being implemented
with the same software constraints as the
Operational Version.
* Operational missions, procedures and environ-
ment can be used.
Before departing these introductory comments, it is
important that SM be placed in perspective. Roles similar
to that of SM are being performed by other Orbiter Functions.
First, emergency warnings such as fire or loss of cabin
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pressure are handled exclusively by a separate, dedicated,
hardwired system. Second, for purposes of fast reaction
automatic redundancy fault recovery, Guidance Navigation and
Control (GN&C) performs its own fault detection. Only the
results of this detection may be passed on to SM. SM does
not have direct access to GN&C subsystems data. Finally,
alerts signifying potential hazards, such as highActive
Thermal Control temperature indications, fall into a category
known as Caution and Warning (C&W). These events are handled
by a dedicated, hardware system known as C&W which drives
panel annunciators. SM provides a software backup to C&W.
Of the remaining vehicle parameters, those most used or those
of greatest importance are displayed on panel instruments at
the several crew stations.
This introduction has been divided into four major
topics. Objectives of the study are outlined in Section 1.1.
This section is followed by a description of how the report
has been organized in Section 1.2. Section 1.3 of the intro-
duction provides a synopsis of the study program, describing
the actual course of the study. This section also responds
to the objectives cited in Section 1.1. Finally, Section 1.4
outlines the approach to the system analysis which occupies
the majority of this volume.
1.1 Study Objectives
The overall objectives of this study are to,
(a) establish analytical procedures and (b), perform a com-
prehensive systems analysis of the Operational Flight Version
of the Shuttle Orbiter System Management (SM) computer func-
tion. The latter objective requires no additional comment.
The first objective consists of three specific analytical
procedures, the first of which is functional concepts for
performance verification. This procedure includes:
* Criteria for selecting functions for
which monitoring is most effective.
* Monitoring techniques.
* Criteria for selecting subsystem and
redundancy string data extraction
points.
* False alarm avoidance and recovery.
* Computer self-testing.
The second procedure includes the definition of
pertinent tradeoffs between real-time onboard analysis and
control and real-time ground-based analysis and command using
the STDN with and without TDRSS.
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The final procedure includes analytical simulation
programs capable of predicting results of proposed changes
in system.configuration, operating parameters, and capable
of evaluating the effectiveness of fault detection techniques.
1.2 Report Organization
The report has been basically organized around the
study objectives. Volume I is dominated by the SM system
analysis with some supporting investigations. Volume II is
dedicated to the formulation of automated performance veri-
fication concepts and techniques.
Sections 2.0 and 3.0 of Volume I, this volume,
contain the SM Baseline Operational Version system analysis.
The reader should expressly note that the Baseline Design is
described in Appendix B to this volume. This was done to
preserve report continuity. Also, Section 1.4 below provides
the structure for the system analysis.
Section 2.0 identifies the user needs and assesses
the design suitability from an applications viewpoint. Based
on these assessments an alternative design is developed and
described.
Section 3.0 provides an implementation assessment
by contrasting the Baseline Design to the alternative design.
Section 4.0 contains investigations supporting the system
analysis. Topics believed to merit further study are
enumerated in Section 5.0.
Appendix A contains some additional SM design con-
siderations. These considerations were not included in the
alternative design since the implications of their integration
were not completely investigated.
The contents of Appendix B were discussed above.
The original SM concept is believed represented by Appendix
C. This appendix contains an excerpt from the SM performance
specification.
Volume II of the report structures the automated
performance verification problem by critically examining what
is demanded of such an endeavor and then providing general
concepts, techniques and guidelines for achieving these de-
mands. The concepts and techniques are applied in an example
verification design for the Orbiter Hydraulics System.
1.3 Study Program Synopsis
The study objectives were addressed by first de-
fining the concepts and then applying these concepts to the
system analysis. Formulating the automated performance
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verification concepts occupied the first half of the study.
Attention was then turned to applying these concepts to the
system analysis. It was soon discovered that while these
concepts provided significant insight and direction, they did
not address the whole SM problem. Basically, the concepts
provided the where with all to address how performance veri-
fication was to be done. They did not answer what to do with
the verification information or allow judgments regarding
selection of the appropriate technique to use. There were
obviously requirements and constraints over and above perfor-
mance verification. Not until SM was viewed as a crew
Management Information System, instead of just a performance
'monitor, did the source and character of the additional re-
quirements come into view. This placed SM in a larger context
and allowed the total analysis problem to be addressed. For
it is crew information needs which controlled the "what" as
well as technique judgments. It came as no surprise when the
analysis found the Baseline Design had not given this same
area sufficient attention.
Management Information Systems are user-oriented.
Their performance is judged by what information the user
needs and how well the system serves those needs. The anal-
ysis was then restructured with a significant portion
addressing SM application.
All the study objectives were met except one, the
SM cost/performance prediction simulator. At the time the
analysis was being restructured, attempts began at defining
this simulator. After considerable definition and some trial
runs it was concluded that systems such as SM have not reached
a formal enough stage in design definition to warrant a
practical simulation. The problems centered around quantifi-
cation and lack of sensitivity to system design changes. In
lieu of a simulator, an analytical assessment technique was
developed.
Considering the alternative design and extensive
application analysis contributions which were not part of
the original objectives, the study is believed to have contri-
buted a good deal more than was originally intended.
1.4 System Analysis Approach
There has likely never been a design that could not
be improved. The spirit of the analysis is one of design
improvement and is not intended to be a condemnation. In
keeping with this spirit, a constructive alternative is
offered.
As indicated earlier, the SM Baseline version being
analyzed is the Operational version rather than the ALT
Version. So that this system analysis could be completed
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on schedule, it became necessary to freeze design evolutions
in October, 1974. At this time no Operational Version had
been specified. Rather than attempt an analysis using a
temporary test version environment, an Operational Version
was defined as part of the study. This approach is believed
to offer the greatest value to the Government. The Operational
Version Definition was built on the following observations:
a. The ALT version constitutes a subset of
the total Operational Version capability.
b. The design is to evolve through its
various revisions to achieve the final
version.
c. In light of (b), the processes, capa-
bilities, procedures and crew interface
used for the ALT version would remain
the same in the Operational Version.
d. The Operational Version would comply with
the complete capability defined in the
original RDD, SD-72-SH-0103-8, Vol. 5-8,
Jan 1974.
The Operational Version Baseline Definition con-
thined in Appendix B to this volume uses the ALT functional
definitions for those functions to be included in ALT. The
remaining functions were defined per the RDD.
Will the accuracy of the Operational Version
Baseline affect the study results? The answer is, very little.
First, based on the rationale for achieving the Operational
Version, the resulting definition should be a good deal more
than just a "straw man." Second, the vast majority of im-
provements recommended by the study are centered squarely at
ALT version definitions. Finally, the system analysis is
not limited to identifying Baseline weaknesses, but more
importantly, it establishes requirements for an operational
version by stating what the design should be.
Turning now to the system analysis itself, any
such analysis is based on disciplines applicable to the system
under study as well as the definition of the system itself.
The disciplines supporting the analysis were developed as
part of the study and appear in Volume II of this report.
The system definition, however, requires further discussion.
System definition must be distinguished from design
definition. The latter describes an approach for realizing
a system. The former describes what the system is/does. It
represents the basic concept of the system. The importance
of this distinction should become clear in the following
discussions.
1-5
SM has been tagged as a performance monitor. So
long as this definition (and that is unquestionably what it
is) persists, the full realization of the system will suffer.
For example, under this definition the performance verifi-
cation discipline developed during this study was of limited
value in the analysis. This is not because the discipline
is incomplete. On the contrary, it is a comprehensive treat-
ment of how to do performance verification design. It does
not consider what the results are to be used for. Neither
does it provide the criteria for selecting which technique
is best or for establishing design priorities. Such con-
siderations are derived from a larger context. Thus, the
performance monitor definition of SM, without a larger set of
considerations, is inadequate. And, the larger set of con-
siderations are not explicit in any of the SM developmental
documentation.
If an SM system analysis is to be performed, the
additional considerations must be defined. The obvious
starting point is in the system definition itself. What
describes the totality of SM contribution? What does it do?
Looking over the spectrum of SM development, a significant
point comes to light; SM is first a user aid to managing
vehicle/payload resources and then a performance monitor. SM
can then be defined in the much broader context of a user
management information system. In this context, the identity
of the larger set of considerations becomes clear. These
considerations involve the operations of the system, its
application, its user interface and, indeed, its design
suitability. These are the considerations which dictate
what is to be done with the performance verification results,
which allow design priorities to be set, which allow tradeoff
of techniques.
To recap, a significant analysis result has already
been identified, i.e., SM must be evaluated in the broader
sense of its application. The remainder of this discussion
will deal with how this is to be done. As might be expected,
a system analysis which includes a redefinition of the system
will necessarily involve development of additional require-
ments. A new perspective must be developed. To do this, an
applications assessment has been performed and is contained
in Section 2.0. In order that a complete perspective be
achieved, the applications assessment consists of three in-
dependent assessments, each with a different viewpoint. These
are:
* A user assessment which provides the
user's viewpoint and develops user
requirements.
* A functional assessment which provides
the operations viewpoint and develops
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operations requirements on the SM
functional relationships.
* An original concept assessment which
pursues Baseline compliance with the
original SM concept.
The theme of these assessments is developing requirements
which are necessary for SM to fulfill its larger role and
which will allow application of the performance verification
discipline. The Baseline is then assessed against these
requirements and improvement areas are cited.
So that the assessment findings can be integrated
in a concise manner, an alternative SM design is presented
based on the developed requirements. This accomplishes two
goals of the analysis. First, it presents a constructive
summary of results. Second, it desensitizes the results to
the accuracy of the Baseline Design. Whether the Baseline
is accurate or not, the alternative design provides a bench-
mark against which any design can be measured.
The analysis has thus far concentrated on applica-
tions suitability ,and has culminated in an alternative design.
What about implementation? Implementation must be considered.
It is obvious that the alternative design has not been carried
to the point of implementation. It could be implemented in
dozens of ways. As of the study design freeze in October,
the Baseline implementation had not been specified either.
The Baseline per se could also not be analyzed from an imple-
mentation standpoint. There is, however, sufficient material
by way of detailed functional descriptions, core estimates,
CPU loading estimates and user interface to gain a reasonably
accurate description of Operational Version implementation
needs. An implementation comparative analysis is, then,
quite feasible. Such an analysis is contained in Section 3.0.
Here, implementation of the alternative design is evaluated
relative to that of the Baseline.
Section 4.0 of this volume contains special investi-
gations supporting the system analysis. Avoiding and handling
false alarms is the subject of Section 4.1. This subject is
treated for both procedural and mechanized approaches. Sections
4.2 through 4.8 advance the treatment of off-line items, sampled
data problems, SM restarts, ground support trades, critical
SM interfaces and last but not least, SM analytical techniques.
Sections 4.7 and 4.8 support the necessity of considering SM
applications.
Attention is also called to Appendix A which con-
tains several SM design options which resulted from the system
analysis.
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2.0 DESIGN SUITABILITY--AN APPLICATIONS VIEWPOINT
As indicated in Section 1.4, this section addresses
three aspects of Baseline Design suitability. They are:
(a) a user assessment, (b) a functional assessment and (c),
an original concept assessment. Each assessment was performed
as independently as possible. The theme is one of building
three self-contained cases, each with a different objective
in mind, to establish a composite and complete picture of
Baseline improvement candidates. Each assessment not only
identifies problem areas in the Baseline but also advances
solutions by indicating what the approach should be. The
assessments, then also establish design requirements for an
SM design. This section is completed by an alternative design
which fulfills these developed requirements. This design was
produced for three reasons. First, it offers a constructive
alternative. Second, it is the most convenient way to achieve
reader identification and at the same time tie all the assess-
ment finding neatly together. Finally, since the Baseline
represents an extrapolation of the existing design, it is more
equitable to indicate what an Operational Version of SM should
be, rather than to indicate what the Baseline should not be.
Since the alternative design has been produced from
these application assessments, what about implementation con-
siderations? This is best answered by considering the purpose
of a functional analysis. Such an analysis concerns itself
with the functional relationships and input-output of the de-
sign constituents. Also, it is the first level at which con-
straints are introduced on the implementation resulting from
application of the system, its environment, interfaces, sus-
ceptibility to change, options which should be held open, etc.
Thus, gross implementation requirements are also established
in this section. These requirements are evaluated in Section
3.0 by contrasting alternative design implementation consid-
erations with those of the Baseline.
The reader is reminded that much of this assessment
is based on findings from several special investigations
which preceded it chronologically. These investigations are
contained in Section 4.0 of this volume and Volume II to the
report. These investigations should be consulted for addi-
tional supporting material. Some of the topics in Section 4.0
provide further elaboration on those contained in Volume II.
The first applications assessment concerns the user
viewpoint. It is contained in Section 2.1. Section 2.2
provides the second independent assessment, the functional
analysis. Here, design requirements are developed based on
operational considerations. Baseline shortcomings are also
discussed. Section 2.3 contrasts the Baseline Design to the
original SM concept. This assessment is performed to test
the specification evolution.
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Findings of the three independent assessments are
consolidated in Section 2.4. This section also advances the
probable cause of the design shortcomings. Finally, Section
2.5 presents the alternative design.
2.1 A User Viewpoint -The First Assessment
The purpose of this section is to assess the Base-
line Design in Appendix B from a user's viewpoint. What do the
users need? When do they need it? In what form do they need
it? Three SM users have been identified. They are the crew,
the payload owner and Ground Maintenance. There is very little
available information regarding the latter user and an assess-
ment of his needs was not attempted. The most important
information to Ground Maintenance will be that which relates
to anomalies which occur in flight and whose conditions cannot
be duplicated on the ground. Extending this general statement
to specifics is a crucial task and should be a topic for further
study. (For that matter, the entire problem of analyzing vehicle
flight data to pinpoint failed LRU's should prove to rank among
the most challenging problems of the program.)
Of the remaining two users, interests of the payload
owner are assumed served by the crew Payload Specialist who
has direct access to SM. These two users will then be treated
collectively as the crew.
An assessment of this sort is best approached by
first developing a picture of what the user will need and then
contrasting that composite picture with the design to be
assessed. Section 2.1.1 develops such a picture and Section
2.1.2 provides the actual Baseline assessment by way of
contrasts.
2.1.1 Flight Crew Needs
In order to ascertain the needs of the flight crew,
one must project himself into their position under a plausible
flight environment. To do this, mission scenarios have been
developed using viable crew roles. It is not necessary to
develop scenarios for the entire flight since SM use can be
characterized by two distinct applications: (a) vehicle assess-
ment check just prior to committing to a new mission phase,
e.g., changing orbit and (b) on orbit stay. So as not to be
too general in the scenario, the first application was specifi-
cally performed for the Post Launch phase which occurs once the
vehicle has achieved its initial orbit. The same scenario will
apply to all phase-change checks, e.g., deorbit, except that
points of interest will vary.
2.1.1.1 Post Launch Phase
Assume that launch and orbital insertion have been
successfully accomplished and the Orbiter is now in a safe
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parking orbit. The crew must have information on sub-system
status, consumables and desired vehicle configuration to
perform the next maneuver in the mission profiles in order to
make a GO/NO-GO decision on whether to continue the mission
or return to base.
Table 2.1.1.1 presents a task outline of possible
post launch vehicle assessment crew tasks when it may be de-
sirable to assess the condition of the vehicle equipment
following the stress associated with launch and its capability
to allow successful accomplishment of the next phase of the
mission. A gross level task analysis is shown in Figure
2.1.1.1.* It is an attempt to identify some of the decisions
which the crew must make to assess mission "GO/NO-GO" status
and to reflect the kind of information which could aid the
crew in making these decisions. Sketches of CRT displays have
been included as exemplary of the kind of information which
could aid .the crew decision-making process and not necessarily
a representation of information display implementation.
In an operational situation such as the one under
consideration, there are several levels of information required
by the crew with each level satisfying specific functional
requirements. In the stress of a time-critical situation, it
is mandatory that the crew be informed when a failure occurs
that could jeopardize flight safety and which requires imme-
diate crew response. Extraneous information displayed will
tend to distract the crew and increase their time to detect,
recognize and respond to a critical display. When the situ-
ation has stablized, the crew may then wish to assess the
effect of the fault on the vehicle's ability to accomplish the
intended mission. Now it becomes necessary to display informa-
tion to aid the crew in recalling or identifying specifically
what malfunction has occurred. As in the previous situation,
presentation of information not specifically required to
identify the malfunctions will tend to confuse or add "noise"
to the overall display environment as well as increase crew
reaction time and probability of overlooking a malfunction
which has occurred.
The first level of information will necessarily
concern C&W and vehicle functional paths. Therefore, "exception
displays" which list only the failed functional paths or C&W
out of tolerance identifiers were given as examples of a gross
identification level display. Based on crew knowledge of
vehicle systems and the identification of the fault which
occurred, the crew may be able to determine, without further
information, the criticality of the fault to subsequent mission
phase performance. For instance, assume that a TACAN 3 fault
*This figure has been placed at the end of Section 2.1 for the
reader's convenience.
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Table 2.1.1.1 Post Launch Vehicle Assessment Task Outline
Crew Task: To decide GO/NO-GO for next phase of mission.
Must be able to:
Vehicle
1) Ascertain current status of sub-system per-
formance.
* Are all functional paths "up"?
* Extent of options and/or redundancy available?
* Are all parameter measurements within nominal
limits?
2) Ascertain current status of consumables.
* Remaining quantity?
* Quantity required for safe return?
* Quantity required for performance of next
mission phase?
Predicted quantity remaining after completion
of next mission phase?
* Predicted quantity for safe return after
completion of next mission phase?
3) Ascertain vehicle configuration is correct for
successful performance of next mission phase.
Payload
1) Ascertain current status of sub-system perform-
ance.
2) Ascertain current status of consumables.
IF: The above conditions are determined to be "GO",
initiate next mission phase.
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indication occurred during launch. This equipment would
have no effect on the vehicle's ability to perform an orbital
translation and could be relegated as not critical to next
mission phase. The crew could then divert their attention to
faults which might be critical in the upcoming mission maneuver.
Simple name identification of a fault might be in-
sufficient for the crew decision on fault criticality. They
may need further information indicating the consequences of a
functional path which has malfunctioned. For example, assume
that the functional path HYD 1 has failed. What vehicle
functions does it service? Nose wheel steering? Main landing
gear extension? Flight control actuation? And further, are
there backup systems which could be switched or are there even
redundant suppliers of these functions? This next level of
display provides information on a specific functional
path rather than the entire vehicle. This is illustrated by
the display labeled "identify effect." In Figure 2.1.1.1,
HYD 1 services nose wheel steering and HYD 3 is redundant. With
this information, the malfunction could be judged not critical
to the next mission phase by the crew in the present scenario.
If the malfunction were in a system that was deter-
mined to be critical to the next mission phase, a requirement
might exist for a higher detail level of information about
the elements which make-up a functional path. It may be
necessary at this point to display actual measures, limits
associated with each measure and interaction of the elements
within the functional path. It may be desirable to present
measurement readings of the parameters on the CRT and at the
same time provide functional path block diagrams by means of a
film viewer to allow the mission specialist to assess element
interaction. The capability should exist to scan across
systems, where several are performing identical functions, to
make a comparative check, e.g., the three APU turbine RPMs or
a comparison of the three catalytic convertor bed temperatures.
In each of the information display situations thus
discussed, it is important not to present too much information.
That is, information not required for the immediate decision
at hand. However, it is equally important to provide infor-
mation display which will aid the operator in assessing a
particular performance measure. In the examples presented,
this was done in one instance with a "lubber line" -- the
planned consumption bar shown on the hypothetical Consumables
Quick Scan Display. The quantity indicators for the various
consumables should track or exceed the planned consumption bar,
which is positioned as a function of mission time for a planned
mission profile, as estimated consumption rates. Not to exceed
limits are also shown in the minimum safe return quantity bars.
Presenting performance measure indications such that
desired performance will be located within a specified region
of the display or will track a command line, considerably
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enhances the operators ability to detect out-of-tolerance
conditions; even in rapid scan situations with diverse perform-
ance measures -- inches, pounds, gallons, psi. For the in/out
tolerance level of information, this type of display enhances
operator performances due to the fact that it is much easier
to distinguish position location differentials than it is to
mentally read and compare numerical values. The baseline
design presents information such as LINE TEMP = 68.9 0 F on the
System Measurement Management Display. If this is an out of
limit condition, a "bug" is presented adjacent to the readout.
No information is presented to indicate how far out of limits
this indication might be or if it is in limits, whether it is
approaching an upper or lower limit.
In the post launch vehicle assessment, if all the
sub-decisions are favorable and a "GO" decision is reached
for initiation of the transorbital maneuver, it might be de-
sirable to initiate a payload checkout to determine its status.
However, its quite conceivable that the payload checkout may
not be accomplished until just prior to payload eject after
performance of the transorbital maneuver. In either case,
information would be required which indicated functional path
performance within the payload, consumables status and payload
system configuration prior to eject to prohibit ejection of
malfunctioning payload. If the crew determines that payload
capabilities have been significantly degraded, then the payload
may be returned to base for repair.
2.1.1.2 On-Orbit Phase
During the on-orbit phase, crew information needs,
other than those served by dedicated vehicle instruments,
would probably be primarily concerned with long term perform-
ance monitoring and declaration of functional path out of
tolerance conditions. It is expected that the Mission Specialist
would periodically request the quick scan displays to allow an
updated assessment of vehicle conditions and capabilities. The
SM quick scan capability would relieve the crew of the rather
monotonous and tedious task of reading extended numerical dis-
plays.
The continuous monitoring capability, viz., C&W and
functional path fault detection, would reduce necessary crew
vigilance. This would enhance the probability of rapid de-
tection and recognition of a fault which would otherwise be
reduced, resulting from crew performance degradation over time
due to fatigue.
2.1.2 Contrasts To The Baseline
When comparing the above-developed needs with Baseline
capabilities, the first observation to be made is, unfortunately,
a rather sweeping one. There is very little similarity between
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the crew needs portrayed in the scenarios and the Baseline
Design. The information needed by the crew is available
alright, but its presentation leaves something to be desired.
The two single characteristics which are violated are infor-
mation levels and content separation. In the Baseline, C&W
and alert conditions, even though their occurrence is signaled
differently, are intermixed on the same display. Assuming the
crew must rely on this backup C&W, they will want to work out
C&W problems first. These should not be cluttered with in-
formation from potentially dozens of parameters, many of which
they will not even be interested in at the moment.
,A significant level of information to the crew is the
status of functional paths. Furthermore, this must be the next
level of concern following C&W. They should not have to pour
through parameters to determine this information which they
need straight away. Once functional path status has been de-
termined, the crew, at some convenient time, can investigate
the whys and wherefores. The Baseline does not recognize this
separation or level of information.
The Baseline parameter displays do not show how far
a parameter is out of tolerance nor do they indicate how close
an in-tolerance parameter is to its limits. In addition, the
"digital type" presentation will be hard to track when param-
eter variations are of interest. Finally, it will be quite
difficult for these displays to be.scanned while station
keeping.
Remaining consumables should be part of a configura-
tion check. There is currently no way for the crew to assess
just how far they are out from minimum recommended levels.
When a functional path is identified as having failed,
the Baseline presents no information (at least in defined dis-
plays) as to the consequences of this failure. Failure of one
redundant path often leads to different consequences than the
failure of another path in the same group.
If the crew is to actually assess the extent of their
problem, they will need to know more than just the state of a
heater or switch or the value read by a transducer. They will
need to know their location and their relationship to other
readings and functions. This can only be accomplished by sys-
tem block diagrams (styalized to whatever degree). Placing
these diagrams on mass memory is wasteful of storage and re-
sulting CRT display will be of questionable quality. Besides,
the crew member pursuing the problem should have the diagram
and the SMM display simultaneously. These diagrams should be
either on indexed cards or on microfilm which can be viewed
while viewing the SMM display. The latter is considered a
better choice since there will likely be other data which will
be of value to the crew, e.g., functional descriptions, which
could be economically carried on board on this medium.
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In concluding this assessment, it is recognized that
some of the shortcomings identified here could easily be han-
dled by procedures. It is recommended that a trade study be
instituted to document which items will be handled by procedures
and which by SM. In effect, this would trade paper for software.
2.2 Functional Analysis -The Second Assessment
Section 2.1 provided a user's assessment of the Base-
line Design assuming scenarios to characterize user demands.
This section will examine the defined Baseline processes from
a systems viewpoint. In effect, the preceding section assessed
the system Input/Output and this section will assess the in-
ternal system processing. The Baseline Design is defined in
Appendix B to this volume.
The assessment will consider five design criteria:
time line, design independence (with respect to vehicle/payload
design), process criticality, potential implementation of pro-
cess on the ground and credibility of system output. Results
of the individual criterion assessments are collected in Table
2.2.6 in the summary of this section.
2.2.1 Time Line Assessment
A generic mission profile for the Orbiter is shown
in Figure 2.2.1. The purpose of this assessment is to investi-
gate when the SM functions will be used on this profile for
purposes of core overlay and loading considerations as well as
process partitioning considerations. The results will also be
used in Section 2.2.4 when potential ground implementation is
considered.
Each process will be classified as to whether it takes
place:
C - continuously throughout the profile or at un-
scheduled or random points in the profile, or
P - at predetermined or scheduled points on the
profile, or
S - during predetermined or scheduled periods on
the profile.
In the first classification, no distinction has been made be-
tween a function being scheduled for the entire mission and
one that will be required at unpredictable times. This is
based on the observation that the underlying cause of functions
being required randomly is the occurrence of an out-of-tolerance
parameter in the Orbiter subsystems. Since it is the purpose
of SM to detect such conditions, there is obviously no way to
schedule the appropriate function within any reasonable call-up
time. The function will, then, effectively be required on a
continuous basis.
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Figure 2.2.1. Orbiter Mission Profile
A distinction has been made between points in time
and periods of time. The purpose of this distinction is to
allow an assessment of the degree to which residency and back-
ground/foreground requirements may conflict. For practical
purposes, a point in time is considered to describe an operation
which is very short compared to the mission duration (several
minutes). A period of time is not necessarily short (several
hours).
Fault Detection and Annunciation (FDA), Data Record-
ing Management (DRM) and portions of Payload Support are clearly
classified as continuously required processes. The fact that only
portions of Payload Support, viz., the counterparts to vehicle
FDA, are continuous processes indicates that this process can
be partitioned into two processes for overlay and ground support
considerations. This option should be left open for further
trades, implementation considerations and growth assessments.
Since the Baseline makes no time line distinctions regarding
partitions of Payload Support, the entire process must be
classified as taking place in continuous time.
Subsystem Measurement Management (SMM) is used by the
crew in the Baseline Design as a necessary adjunct to FDA. For,
without SMM, FDA results are far from conclusive. Therefore,
SMM will also be considered to be required on a continuous basis.
Subsystem Configuration Monitoring (SCM) and Telemetry
Format Selection (TFS) are used at predetermined points in the
mission. Referring to Figure 2.2.1, SCM might be used at the
end of Mission Phase D, several times during Phase E and certain-
ly just prior to Phase F. TFS usage would somewhat correlate
with these same events.
On the surface, Consumables Management (CM) would
appear to be required on a continuous basis due to "random"
call-ups by the crew. This argument is valid, not due to random
crew call-ups, but rather due to that portion of CM which is
required to log consumables consumption for historical consump-
tion rate displays. That portion of CM which generates displays
is another matter. The fact is that, upon call-up, when this
portion of the process is actually performed is not critical (so
long as a "reasonable" response time is realized). Thus, this
portion of CM can exploit call-up time and be considered as
being required at scheduled points in the mission (there is
sufficient notification time to "schedule" the event). CM, like
Payload Support, should be partitioned into two processes -- and
for the same reasons. The Baseline does not make a distinction
for CM. The entire process must then be required continuously
for purposes of the Baseline assessment.
Ground Checkout Support is clearly a scheduled period
which corresponds to Mission Phase A.
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2.2.2 Design Independence
This design criterion is intended to reflect the
degree to which the design of an SM process is free of the
effects of a design change in the Orbiter Subsystems. This
section will discuss the considerations in general. A scoring
of this criterion appears in Table 2.2.6.
Two factors must be considered in this assessment:
(a) the volatility of the Orbiter subsystem design and (b), the
degree to which the SM design is "tied" to that design. The
first factor is quickly disposed of. There is but one Orbiter
"subsystem" which is designed to be volatile or flexible. That
is the payload. Any portion of Orbiter avionics which inter-
faces with the payload must be able to accommodate changes.
This directly implies that a separate software partition be
allocated to payload interface so that it may be changed without
affecting design of the remaining SM processes, e.g., FDA, SMM.
This is an additional reason for a further partitioning of Pay-
load Support as indicated in Section 2.2.1. It should be noted
that, while a Payload Support process is identified in the
baseline, there are no restrictions as to how this process is
to be handled.
Returning to the degree to which SM design is tied to
Orbiter subsystem design, it will be expedient to dispose of
those processes which are the most independent. (Payload
Support will not be considered again.) Data Recording Manage-
ment, Telemetry Format Selection and Consumables Management
are relatively insensitive to Orbiter design changes. If for
no other reason, this can be argued on the basis of their
simple interfaces. FDA, SCM and SMM pose quite another problem.
These processes operate on a large number of diverse subsystem
parameters as well as logical relationships among them. These
processes can be quite sensitive to Orbiter design changes.
Furthermore, any routine for assimilating this vast amount of
data can change with crew data demands and even mission phase.
To minimize this susceptability to change (and to increase
growth potential) a data acquisition process should be defined.
Such a process would place a standard interface at all other
SM processes and would also provide the advantage of buffering.
The Ground Support process will also be very sensi-
tive to extra-SM design changes, viz., those occurring in the
Launch Processing System (LPS). Since this purpess is oper-
ating in an entirely different regime, it will not be pursued
here.
Two remaining processes are an Uplink Service and a
Downlist Control. The former services commands/data from the
ground (R.F. or Umbilical), accommodating communications
protocols, queueing and routing. The latter controls the SM
data to be sent to DACBU for inclusion .into the telemetry
stream. These data are currently manually selectable. Both
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these processes have manageable interfaces and should be
rather insensitive to Orbiter design changes.
2.2.3 Process Criticality
It is best to begin a discussion on criticality by
placing the subject in perspective. Loss of the entire SM
function will in no way impede the flight capability of the
Orbiter. Furthermore, it will not have a significant effect
on the inherent safety of the craft. The likelihood of a safe
mission abort will be but slightly diminished. Such a loss
will, however, have a noticeable effect on successful mission
accomplishment. The crew can still fly the craft but they can-
not be informed about its health or condition. In addition,
payload checkout will be much more complicated, if at all
possible, since it would have to be accomplished using a spare
CPU tailored (on the spot) for this task. Finally, ground turn-
around could be extended due to insufficient data on the mainte-
nance recorder. Depending upon the implementation, this could
be overcome by the crew manually controlling the recorder. This
would imply that manual recorder control not be accomplished
through software. A panel switch with talk-back should be used.
Depending on your point of view, loss of SM either
results in almost total loss of autonomy (information pro-
cessed and analyzed on the ground) or a diminished mission
success probability. In actuality, the result will likely
involve both extremes.
Loss of SM will limit the crew's knowledge of Orbiter
status to that which is displayed on panel instrumentation
(which is predominantly flight-critical). They will be able
to respond to emergencies as they arise but will not be able to
plan, to alter their behavior or that of the craft in advance
of these emergencies. They lose a great deal of control of
their own destinies. While not expressly stated, SM, in
addition to apprising the crew of vehicle health, status, etc.,
also affords the crew the capability to effect fixes (not re-
pairs, however). They can actively plan and improve their
condition. What are the advantages of man over-machine in a
spacecraft? What are the advantages of manned vs. unmanned
vehicles? Man adds three important ingredients which no
machine has thus far been able to duplicate on the same time
base. They are rapid adaptability, spontaneity and resource-
fulness. The price paid for these commodities is the weight,
volume and power required to sustain life as well as the
weight and risk of the men themselves. SM is a major link
between the man and the machine. Without it, arguments for
a manned Orbiter are necessarily diminished.
In summary, if the Orbiter were unmanned, there
would be very little need for SM. But, since it is manned,
the role of SM is far from trivial. It is difficult to
attach a true value to its contribution, however, since its
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role is almost exclusively passive and well removed from
the mainstream of activity. An attempt has been made to
rank SM process criticality in Table 2.2.6. Those processes
which affected safety were scored the highest with the re-
maining processes being scored on the amount of information
lost when the process was lost. This lost information
directly affects crew capability and mission success.
As a result of this assessment, two significant
observations can be made. First, that portion of FDA which
serves as C&W backup is the only part of SM that can be
considered to affect safety. Its criticality.ranking is far
above all the others. FDA should be partitioned into two
processes: C&W and alert. This will allow C&W to be treated
individually and also not require C&W restrictions to be
passed on to alert class information.
The second observation deals with a point already
made in Section 2.2.1. That is the implicit but real
association of SMM with FDA. In the Baseline, SMM must be
used to interpret FDA results. It is, then, just as critical.
It should not be. SMM should be used to refine FDA informa-
tion when and if the crew desires to do so.
2.2.4 Potential Process Ground Implementation
It is recognized that none of the SM processes
are planned to be implemented on the ground as this would
decrease autonomy. This topic has been addressed solely on
the basis of a design contingency measure; if it doesn't fit
on board, can it be implemented on the ground? The analysis
is contained in Section 4.5 and is easily summarized by
stating the processes identified in Section 2.2.1 as con-
tinuous processes are not likely ground implementable. The
remaining ones can feasibly be implemented on the ground.
Adhering to the repartitioning recommendations in that
section as well as those in Section 2.2.3 will make this an
even more viable option. The reader should refer to Section
4.5 for more details and to gain more information about the
impact of TDRS on this option.
2.2.5 Credibility of SM Output
What is credibility? It is ones willingness to
believe a statement when presented as factual. And the ...
"as factual" is important. When a statement is qualified in
some manner such that it is presented as supposition and not
fact, ones credibility is not reduced if the statement turns
out to be erroneous. This argument is crucial to achieving
credible SM results. SM is a purveyor of facts and as such
should be correct the vast majority of the time. It is un-
reasonable to expect that SM will be without error and
equally unreasonable to penalize the design which admits
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to errors. It is, then not without reason to require such
a design to qualify results which it has reason to believe
are suspect. The credibility problem, then, can be ap-
proached from two ends: reduce the likelihood of error and
qualify results which are suspect. The former approach is
thesubject of Sections 2.2.5.1, 2.2.5.2 and 2.2.5.3 while
the latter is discussed in Section 2.2.5.4.
If SM is to fulfill its expectations, its results
must be credible. Is credibility a problem with the Base-
line Design? This question is best answered by another
question. Why is virtually every SM operating parameter
changeable in-flight? This capability adds a great deal
of programming complexity, consumes core and increases I/O
traffic. It complicates the use of SM and could well de-
crease credibility since no discipline exists for controlling
or auditing changes. The change capability contributes
little, if any, to flexibility and will probably be of
marginal use in helping to establish SM parameters in actual
flight conditions. It is recognized that it is not possible
to establish firm limits and false alarm constants based
solely on paper analyses. It is also recognized that un-
controlled "fiddling" with these parameters will not go much
farther. This is a task best left to postflight ground
computer analysis using telemetry data. Determine the
values in non-real-time with the power of a ground processor
when all the facts are in. By the time of the first oper-
ational flight, the values should be pretty well established.
While on the subject of SM parameters, there is
a gross distinction that must be made regarding the limits
set for parameters. Regardless of how they are arrived at,
these limits represent someone's belief of what constitutes
the dividing line between acceptable and unacceptable. The
crew, however, will likely see this judgement differently.
They .may go along with a set of nominal limits so long as
everything is running smoothly. When they get into a tight
place, they are willing to judge performance less critically.
They are simply not going to give up if a value is declared
unacceptable under nominal conditions when it is still good
enough to get them home with reasonable safety. Further-
more, it is under just such circumstances that SM could be
their best aid in determining a strategy. To fulfill-these
requirements, each critical parameter should have two sets
of limits, one representing nominal performance and the
other representing emergency performance. The latter should
be set such that it is admittedly riskier but not dis-
asterous. The crew will likely want to assess their situa-
tionwith the entire vehicle being judged under one or the
other sets of limits. This precludes individual parameter
selection, allowing a single decision to be made. SM simply
uses either all nominal limits or all emergency limits.
2-13 ORIGINAL PAGE IN
OF POOR QUALITY
2.2.5.1 C&W Performance Vs. Alert Performance
C&W class conditions and alert class conditions
are handled together in the common process of FDA. These
two conditions vary dramatically in their criticality and
response time requirements. C&W conditions are quite
critical and demand rapid response time with very low false
alarms. Response times for alert conditions are not so
critical and some false alarms can be tolerated. It may
seem that both conditions could be accommodated by the single
process with adjustments in limits and false alarm avoid-
ance constants. Unfortunately, this is not the case.
Before advancing this argument and offering a
solution, some ground work must be layed. First, this
assessment is based on the analysis contained in Section
4.1 and material in Section 8.0 of Volume II of this report.
Second, the definition of a false alarm is self-explanatory
but that of a miss is not often as well understood. A miss
occurs when a condition is not recognized within a pre-
scribed notification time. Given enough chances, almost
any scheme will eventually detect an out-limit condition.
Thus, any process which replicates decisions on the same
parameter (such as FDA) will, with high probability,
eventually discover an out-limit condition. A miss, then,
is tied to response time and the two terms are often used
to describe the same behavior (although they are strictly
two different performance criteria of a decision process).
More will be said about misses in Section 2.2.5.3.
Returning to the argument advanced at the outset
of this section, it will be appropriate to examine the FDA
process. Here, decisions are made on the respective param-
eters and these decisions are passed on to a smoother which
demands "N" consecutive decisions before it declares the
parameter as out-of-limits. The issue is the smoother or
false alarm avoidance. As the name implies, the scheme
is quite effective at avoiding false alarms. It also, un-
fortunately, has a very high miss probability or response
time for certain kinds of parameter behavior. C&W conditions
are almost exclusively parameter value checks which will be
typified by a gradual crossing of the parameter limit.
Furthermore, the value of this limit is usually quite
critical, i.e., there is little latitude in changing its
value. The smoothing scheme employed for C&W will have a
step response of "N" counts which is usually quite good for
data which is typified by jump behavior such as catastrophic
failures.
When a step response is cited for a smoother, it
is usually assumed that it will do better for all other
kinds of inputs. This is not so for the "pump-up" or post-
decision scheme used in FDA. In fact, its step response
represents the shortest possible response it will have to
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any input and any value of "N" greater than unity. Thus
the use of post-decision schemes as a smoothing device for C&W
is a questionable practice. It will typically result in.
extrapolated response times or increased miss errors.
Since ample arguments have already been advanced
for treating C&W separately, it is worth while to consider an
alternative method of smoothing. The method is first order
recursive smoothing and it has the advantage of guaranteeing
a maximum response time. The step (worst case) response of
this smoother is shown in Figure 2.2.5.1 which is reproduced
from Volume II of this report. The smoothing constant, alpha,
is selected to achieve the maximum reduction in parameter
variance (minimum probability of false alarm) while not
violating the response time requirement. The reader is re-
ferred to Volume II for further performance details, and to
Section 4.1 for implementation considerations.
In operation, the smoother is placed before the
decision device, thus the name predecision smoothing which
appears in Section 4.1. The decision device or limit checker
then operates on the smoothed parameter and once it finds the
limit has been reached, annunciates the condition.
Recursive smoothing has one drawback that post-
decision smoothing does not. It is sensitive to time jitter
in the input data. This should not pose a problem with C&W
data since its criticality justifies some extra care in data
acquisition.
2.2.5.2 Error Reduction And The Number Of Decisions
It has been noted that C&W should be removed from
FDA. What else can be done to reduce errors? In the Baseline
Design, FDA is limit checking well over 1,000 parameters at an
average rate of two per second. Are this many decisions
necessary? It is recognized that misses are not of particular
concern since the limit checks are replicated and response
time is not too critical for alert conditions. It is further
recognized that the false alarm avoidance constant can be
set arbitrarily large, thus forcing false alarms, even for
a seven day mission, to be few in number. The true issue
involves both characteristics. The greater the number of
decisions made, the higher will be the likelihood of a false
alarm. Thus, the smoothing constants will have to be in-
creased in value. This results in possibly unnecessary
delay if the number of decisions can be reduced. Further-
more, FDA is deciding when a parameter goes out of limits and
again decides if and when it comes back in limits. Since
the crew are not told when a parameter becomes good again,
its only utility is in helping to decide when the parameter
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Figure 2.2.5.1. Step Response for a First Order Recursive Smoother
goes bad again. What results is a chain of conditional
decisions which further complicates the error problem.
Added to the above considerations are those of the
crew and the payload owner. Do they need all these de-
cisions? Can they even use them? Is it even practical to
attempt them? Section 2.1 suggests a no to the first two
questions and following material will show that it is not
practical, or at least not desirable, to attempt them.
Dismiss FDA for the moment and consider a process
which determines directly the status of Orbiter functional
paths or redundant legs. Using approximately 200 well
chosen parameters, this process could determine such status
using the same processes now existing in FDA. The "pump-up"
decision smoothing technique is well suited for this task
since principal interest would be with parameters which
changed suddenly. And, if a value (indicative of how well
the particular functional path was operating) stayed close
to the limit for an extended period of time, any delay
encountered in annunciating this condition would be
tolerable. This comes about since the status indications
would still represent alert conditions and it is not crucial
to know exactly when a limit is exceeded.
The possibilities of having quorum, i.e., n of m
decisions before annunciating, post-decision rules was
given a very light treatment and should be pursued further.
Based on this brief examination, however, it appeared that
any advantages to be gained would be outweighed by require-
ments for more processor resources.
In contrast to C&W which is concerned with values
of parameters per se, the above process is concerned with
status of functional paths directly. The distinction seems
trivial but the approach to the two processes is entirely
different. The former is a parameter checker and the latter
is a fault or failure checker. Volume II of this report is
devoted to methods of achieving such failure checkers. Also,
the Appendix to that volume contains an example worked for
the Orbiter Hydraulics System.
What about the remaining 800 or so subsystem
parameters? Neither the Functional Path Fault Detector nor
C&W need results of limit checks on these parameters to
accomplish their tasks. In addition, the functional path
information already processed provides the crew with suffi-
cient information at the minimum level for which they can
take corrective action.* The remaining parameters are then
*There are some exceptions to this, e.g., OMS-RCS fuel cross-
feeds. These cases should be treated as exceptions and
solved individually.
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of value in assisting the crew (or payload owner) to de-
termine the extent of the functional path loss or to
gain a more complete picture of Orbiter condition when the
need arises. The crew does not need routine decisions on
these parameters. In fact, such routine decisions can only
aggravate the false alarm problem.
Pursuing the crew assessment case, out of limit
parameters constitute only a portion of the information
needed by the crew in determining the extent of a problem.
Equally important is the behavior of a parameter and its
relationship to other parameters. Is the parameter fluc-
tuating? Is it remaining constant just at a red line value?
Is it way out of bounds with similar or related parameters?
It is impractical to ask a machine to do this extensive
kind of analysis, especially when there is no way of
knowing which question will be of interest at which time.
Why, then, should the machine even check for out-limit
conditions? It should not. The parameters and their limits
should be displayed and the crew can make this assessment
along with those discussed above. This kind of interpre-
tation is done routinely by crews of conventional aircraft.
They perform meter scans and watch for red line conditions.
The Orbiter crew is not asked to do this routinely, only
when they are troubleshooting. If a display is properly
designed, this will be no burden. The function which pro-
vides these services is only a slight modification of the
existing SMM.
If these parameters are not checked, what about
LRU data on the Maintenance Recorder? This approach will
definitely reduce the number of entries on the recorder.
The issue is whether maintenance data has been jeopardized.
If C&W and Functional Path Fault Detection drive the re-
corder control, all parameters (in the telemetry format)
will be recorded for each major event. What will be missing
are the interim behavioral characteristics of the LRU data.
It is questionable whether these events add much more in-
formation to the maintenance picture, especially when one
considers the cost and scope of a ground-based data
analyzer required to take advantage of the information.
In the final analysis, if it turns out that these limit
check indications are of great value, it would not be
difficult to incorporate a full-time resident checker for
the purposes of triggering the maintenance recorder. The
results of these checks should be transparent to the crew.
They should not enter into the displayed data or alarm
system. In addition, such a limit checker should use the
predecision or recursive smoother described in Section
2.2.5.1
In summary, the above approach decreases the number
of decisions to about one-fifth of those for the Baseline Design
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and the most aggravating sources of potential false alarms
have been removed. This will result in a more viable and
cleaner design as well as a more meaningful output. As an
additional bonus, it is not prudent to declare a functional
path bad and some time later declare it good again if and
when the performance measure for that path drifts back to
"good." Such occurrences should be checked by the crew.
In the fault detection system described above, functional
paths can only be declared bad so there is no need (or
desire) for chains of bad-good-bad... decisions. If the
crew, upon checking the condition (on this small subset of
parameters), believes the functional path good, they must
have the capability of manually overriding the process
decision.
2.2.5.3 Configuration Monitoring and Miss Errors
In all the process discussed thus far, replicated
decisions and misses were of little concern. Subsystem
Configuration Monitoring (SCM) in the Baseline Design is a
one-shot process. It takes its samples when called and makes
decisions based on single values of these samples. If the
crew wishes to recheck these results, they call SCM again.
Since SCM is an exception reporting device, misses are rather
important. An improvement would be to have SCM, each time it
is called, take, say 10, consecutive samples of each param-
eter and declare a disagreement if any of the ten do not
agree with the check list. This is simply exploiting the
post-decision technique used in the Baseline for FDA.
2.2.5.4 SM Self-Check for Disclaiming Factual Output
The preceding three sections discussed methods of
reducing errors to improve credibility. This section will
discuss how to improve credibility in the face of those
errors which remain. Section 2.2.5 discussed the need for
disclaiming factual statements if the statement is known
not to be factual. It will then be necessary to in-
corporate an SM self-tester. Implementation of this
tester is a topic for further study. The tester must have
the following characteristics:
a. Be responsive to data quality monitoring
from the DACBU,RAM, Mass Memory, Payload
MDMs, CRT/keyboard and ICC to SM. This
includes all transfers on buses as well
as the I/O processor and CPU.
b. Be responsive to data timing and missing
data/responses in the above.
c. Be responsive to I/O Processor and CPU
hardware/software faults.
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d. Report a suspect condition by hardwire
to a panel, not through software channels
which have already been declared suspect.
Features accomplishing much of this list already exist.
They have but to be integrated and polished. The IBM CPU
fault detection scheme will undoubtedly play a role but it
should be recognized this scheme does not test the IOP
which is at least as complex as the CPU. The CPU fault de-
tection scheme is a good one but its direct application
should be scrutinized.
The importance of SM self-test can only be ap-
preciated when one compares the reliability (or unreliability
depending on your frame of reference) of the IOP/CPU com-
bination with that of the individual items being checked by
SM. It is seen that the checker is, in many cases, no more
reliable than the items it is checking.
2.2.6 Functional Assessment Summary
Five criteria were used to assess the Baseline
Design. Results of the first four appear in Table 2.2.6 as
scores or classifications. The fifth criterion, credibility,
will be discussed in a later paragraph.
* Process Time Line Use
The classifications for this criterion appear
in the first column of Table 2.2.6. The code
is:
C - continuous or random use
P - used at scheduled points in the mission
S - used during scheduled periods of the
mission
e Design Independence
This criterion is actually scored as design
dependence in the table. Processes with the
highest score are the most sensitive to extra-
SM design changes.
* Criticality
In Table 2.2.6, the highest score represents
those processes which are most critical to the
mission and/or safety. Those affecting safety,
notably C&W, were scored the highest. The FDA
process was partitioned here to indicate the
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Table 2.2.6 Baseline Design Scoring
0.0
o 00
Criterion . a
Process 0 0
FDA C 5 10/5 N
SMM C 5 5 N
SCM P 4 4 Y
CM C 2 3 N
Recorder Mgt. C 1 2 N
TLM Format Select P 2 1 Y
P/L Support C 10 4 N
Uplink Service C 1 2 N
Downlist Control C 1 2 N
Ground C/O Support S N/S N/S N/S
Notes:
1. Top quantity is for C&W, bottom for alert
2. This function can be accomplished other ways
with additional effort.
3. Y - Yes
N - No
N/S - Not Scored
contrast between C&W and alert conditions.
The scores should be interpreted only in
the context of SM functions.
* Potential for Ground Support
This criterion was evaluated simply yes or no.
Modifications to the Baseline partition will
alter these results.
Four methods were identified for improving the
credibility of SM results. These were:
* Treat C&W conditions separately from alert
conditions and employ a different false alarm
avoidance technique for C&W.
* Reduce the number of parameter decisions made
by SM by:
a. Employing a Functional Path Fault Detector.
b. Make no decisions on SMM data.
* Force Configuration Monitoring to replicate list
comparisons automatically and report disagree-
ments for comparisons which don't agree for all
replications.
* Incorporate a SM self-test to flag questionable
output.
2.3 Relationship To The Original Concept -The Third
Assessment
The purpose of this section is to relate the origi-
nal SM performance specifications to the Baseline Definition.
The reasons for this retrospection are simple. First, it
revitalizes the views of the original Orbiter architects.
Such views often tend to fade in the day-to-day efforts to
"make it work." Second, it provides perspective for an ob-jective view of a design milestone. Where does it stand with
respect to achieving original intents and purposes? It is
recognized that implementation may dictate departure from
original concepts. It is also recognized that in systems such
as SM which may be classified as user-oriented,.users' needs
seldom change from those initially identified in gross perform-
ance requirements. Once contrasts between the original concept
and the current approach are identified, so will be the areas
on which to concentrate constructive improvement recommendations.
The original concept is believed best represented
by two sources. The first is Johnson Space Center document
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0700, Vol. X, the applicable portions of which appear below:*
Performance Monitor
A performance monitor function shall be
provided utilizing elements of the in-
strumentation, display and control, and
data processing and software subsystems.
This function shall provide to the flight
crew information concerning health status,
configuration status, and fault detection
and isolation status for flight vehicle
subsystems. This function shall also
support redundancy management to the level
required in flight; onboard fault detection,
isolation and anomaly recording; manage-
ment of orbiter data recording; and
monitoring and management of certain other
inflight functions. An interface shall be
provided for use of the onboard capabil-
ities in support of ground operations.
Payload Data Processing
The Orbiter shall have the capability to
checkout, monitor, and command payloads.
The Orbiter must be capable of performing
this checkout, monitor, and command at
all times after liftoff. A capability for
payload monitoring shall be provided for
all flight phases and ground operations.
Payload caution and warning signals shall
be displayed to the flight crew and at the
mission specialist station. The capability
shall be provided to display payload param-
eters in real-time to the mission specialist
station.
Note, the reference to C&W signals should be
interpreted as software back-up C&W signals.
The second source is the Rockwell International
document SD 72-SH-0103-8, Vol. 5-8. The pertinent portions of
this document have been reproduced in Appendix C to this
volume.
Relating the Baseline Design in Appendix B to the
original concept described by JSC 07700 and the Performance
*Source:. JSC 0700 Vol. X, Rev. A., Space Shuttle Flight and
Ground System Specification; Johnson Space Center, Jan 2, 1974.
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Specification in Appendix C, reveals a rather good corre-
lation. There are, however, three rather important differ-
ences which should be examined. Taking them in order of
occurrence:
* JSC 0700 requires that SM support redundancy
management to the level required in flight.
* The performance specification (Appendix C)
states that the purpose of (FDA) is to de-
tect subsystem failures at the functional
path level (level at which corrective action
can be taken in flight) and inform the crew
that the failure has occurred.
* The performance specification also states
that the purpose of (SMM) is to provide
the crew with access to data from which the
degree of a problem (detected by FDA) can
be assessed.
SM currently does no redundancy management. One
reason may simply be due to differences of opinion as to what
constitutes redundancy management. A second reason is that
subsystem failures are not detected atthe functional path
level. And, unless this is done, automated redundancy manage-
ment can never be implemented. It may also be that redundancy
management was not included on the grounds that automatic
fault recovery for C&W as well as alert class conditions was
neither necessary nor desirable. The exclusion of automatic
fault recovery is a sound decision. The relationship of
redundancy management to this decision, however, is remote.
Redundancy management consists of those functions and/or
processes which keep track of the operational status of the
entire redundancy network and executes those algorithms
necessary to determine what to do in the event of a failure
in any element of that network. Or, stated another way,
redundancy management for System Management would employ
automatic fault detection to the functional path level, a
table of the operational status of each functional path and
a means of displaying this table. In addition, where re-
covery algorithms are complicated, i.e., what to do in the
event of a failure is predictable but depends on a long list
of the state of other functional paths, the algorithm solu-
tions could also be displayed to the crew. This is a viable
description of redundancy management for SM. Note that
automatic switching is not considered. Automatic switching
is a recovery technique and the purpose of redundancy manage-
ment is to tell recovery what to do - be it manual or automatic.
Detecting subsystem failures to the functional path
level is the next subject in the list of differences. As
mentioned above, the current approach does not actually
perform this task. Instead, an attempt is made to identify
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each parameter displayed on the fault summary with a
functional path. The crew can then infer a fault in that
path. Unfortunately, a very large list of parameters is
being checked and it is not always possible to conveniently
accomplish this association. Also, not every parameter
which falls out of tolerance is indicative of a functional
path failure. This distinction may appear subtle but the
fact remains that the crew, not SM, decides whether a fault
exists in a functional path. When considering the large
number of parameters tested under the current concept, this
approach is probably the only reasonable one. If the origi-
nal concept is to be met, it appears that fewer (much fewer)
parameters should enter into the decision. This notion is
pursued in Section 2.5.
The third difference identified above is closely
related to the first two. The original concept cast SMM in
the role of providing information from which the degree of an
FDA-annunciated fault could be ascertained. This implies a
second level of information which can be used at the crew's
discretion. If the crew either desires or needs to know
"how bad the fault is," they may consult SMM. Under the
current concept, SMM is not a second level of information.
Rather, it must actually be used on a routine basis as part
of the man-machine process of identifying faults to functional
paths. The reasons for the current concept are quite likely
similar to those mentioned earlier for other differences.
And, under the current concept, this approach is not without
justification. It is contended, however, that until SMM can
be truly relegated to-a secondary role, the value of SM (or
at least FDA) will be diminished.
2.4 Applications Assessment Summary
Three different assessments have been made on the
Baseline Design and a lot of material has been covered. What
can be concluded? Each assessment used a different frame of
reference and evaluated a different aspect of the design. Do
they reveal similar findings? Are there portions of the
Baseline which could be improved? Is the design suitable for
its application? Beginning with the most chronic conditions,
each assessment found problems with two processes (and their
outputs). These processes were FDA and SMM. The theme which
developed across the three assessments can be summarized as:
* Treat the C&W process, as well as its
display, separately.
* Use a different false alarm avoidance
technique for C&W.
* Do functional path fault detection and
display status of functional paths.
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" Use SMM expressly as an aid to de-
termining extent of problems.
* Reduce the number of parameter de-
cisions made by SMM.
* Provide redundancy information.
It is worthwhile to use some 20-20 hindsight and
determine possibilities of why these problems exist and where
they may have originated. Considering them collectively, the
most prominent cause was lack of sufficient user considerations.
The Baseline seems to have been developed without a thorough
understanding or appreciation of how SM was to be used. While
the user assessments given in the report (especially the
scenarios of Section 2.1.1) are believed sound, they should be
reviewed by JSC flight specialists. It is recommended that
a similar user assessment be made by JSC.
Where did the problems originate? It seems clear
from the third assessment (comparison to original concept)
that the JSC document 0700, Vol. X and the Rockwell Inter-
national RDD, SD 72-SH-0103-8 both considered the user.
Furthermore, it is not within the scope of these documents to
detail how the user is to be considered. The RDD, however,
continues on to specify functions well below the recognized
level for a design definition. The problems apparently origi-
nated in the preparation of the RDD and subsequent specifi-
cations, viz., in the definition of the baseline. The cause
of the omissions does not, then, point directly to the Base-
line Design. This design was simply done prematurely. A
level of specification was omitted between the JSC specifi-
cation and the Baseline which should have detailed how the
intent of the original.concept was to be carried out. This
specification should have (and undoubtedly would have) con-
sidered the use of SM. This level of specification.routinely
includes an operations analysis and is the role which should
have been fulfilled by the RDD.
Numerous other areas, not to mention the specifics
behind the problems identified above, were indentified as
improvement candidates. Rather than simply provide a list of
deficiencies, a more positive approach is to propose something
which overcomes these deficiencies. This is the purpose of
Section 2.5 below where an alternative SM design is described.
Methods for overcoming the cited problems have already been
identified in the applications assessments by indicating what
the approaches should be. The alternative design, likewise,
should be no surprise. If the reader will pardon a lighter
note, the alternative design turns all the "should be's" into
"are ' s. "
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2.5 An Alternative Design
This section describes another approach to SM de-
sign based on the assessments in the preceding sections. It
is not claimed that this approach is the approach nor is it
claimed that it solves all the problems. It is claimed to be
both feasible and reasonable. And, this is its intent. The
design level is the same as that of the assessments. That is,
applications are functionally oriented. Implementation con-
siderations are addressed in Section 3.0.
The design functional flow diagram is shown in
Figure 2.5.* Section 2.5.1 discusses the design overview
from this diagram. Selected processes in the design will be
discussed individually in Section 2.5.2. These discussions
contain more detailed block diagrams of the processes as well
as display formats. Neither the block diagrams nor the dis-
play formats are intended to dictate an implementation. Their
purpose is to provide continuity to the functional flow and
highlight operations as well as information presentation
techniques. It should also be recognized that implementation
will require the introduction of tables and communication not
specifically identified in the block diagrams. For example,
it will be very likely that all values will require parameter
ID tags, either implicitly or explicitly. Data control and
precondition tables will likely be required in addition to
data base maintenance and initialization.
2.5.1 Design Overview
Figure 2.5 identifies 18 SM processes. Some of
these processes may not be contained within SM by the time the
Operational Version is implemented. Payload Commanding is a
good example of this as it could logically be grouped with
several other payload operations under a single software
process which is designated payload peculiar. Whether these
processes are actually a part of SM or not is hardly an issue.
The important point is that they have been identified as
necessary processes and the partition will allow them to be
placed wherever is the most appropriate.
This overview is divided into three areas: (a) ad-
ministrative processes, (b) design structure and operation
and (c), overlay structure which are discussed in Sections
2.5.1.1, 2.5.1.2, and 2.5.1.3 respectively.
2.5.1.1 Administrative Processes
Of the 18 identified SM processes, five qualify as
administrative. These are Keyboard and Display service, Local
*For the convenience of the reader, this figure appears as a
foldout at the end of Section 2.5.
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Exec/Control, Uplink Services and Data Acquisition. Whether
the first four even exist depends on the finalized FCOS inter-
face. All are undeniably operating system functions. They
have been placed on the block diagram in the belief that it is
better to identify a process and have it be absorbed elsewhere
than to find out it is required at software integration. In
this way, the processes can be defined and a verification
made that FCOS does indeed meet the requirement.
The Data Acquisition process is a data routing,
buffering and fetching operation. Constant streams of data
are entering SM and being routed to the various processes.
Some processes are resident and some are overlayed. In ad-
dition, as indicated in Section 2.2.2, certain of these
processes are sensitive to Orbiter subsystem changes. A
central data acquisition process will serve as a design buffer
and allow the individual SM processes to continually fetch
data from a central location with implied identification.
When data requirements change, Data Acquisition can be in-
structed by the other processes. Most importantly, Data
Acquisition should be a partition since it is clearly a fore-
ground task.
2.5.1.2 Design Structure and Operation
In contrast to the Baseline, a new process, Function-
al Path Fault Detection (FPFD), has been defined. In addition,
two new tables, along with their management function, have been
defined. These are Functional PAth Status and Redundancy
Management. The Back Up C&W process has been made an indepen-
dent operation to include its own precondition steering. SMM
does not interface with FPFD, the old FDA process having been
eliminated. SMM does no limit checking. Consumables Manage-
ment (CM) has been partitioned into two processes and provides
data to Subsystem Configuration Monitoring (SCM). The
Redundancy Management process provides an input to Configuration
Monitoring. An SM Performance Monitor has been added as well
as a Payload Services process. This latter process provides
for fixed SM design with a single process which is payload
peculiar. The remaining processes are unchanged.
The processes of SMM, FPFD, CM, SCM and C&W have
been made independent from data input to display. It is entirely
possible that common elements can be defined for these processes
in implementation, thus increasing processing efficiency. Pre-
condition steering is a likely candidate. Whether common pro-
cessing can be defined and implemented depends on the final
overlay structure and detailed level process specifications.
The point here is that, until each element of the independent
process is completely specified, no attempt should be made at
combining operations. The processes were made independent for
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this reason. Design work-arounds to realize commonality
are rarely a good substitute for understanding each problem
and then deciding if commonality exists. More will be said
on this subject in Section 2.5.2.
FPFD operates on a small subset of functional path
data. Its purpose is to make status decisions regarding
these functional paths and to drive the Status Table. The
process has its own set of precondition steering logic. The
Status Table is a permanent record of the state of each
functional path in the vehicle (and payload as required).
These paths include those in the GN&C subsystems. This
table in turn drives a Redundancy Management table whose
purpose is to keep track of what capabilities are lost when
a functional path fails.
FPFD cannot declare a failed functional path good
again. The system is initialized with all paths good. Un-
less manually overridden, the paths, once detected as having
failed, will remain in the failed state in the status table.
Any non-GN&C entry in the Status Table can be
manually changed. A functional path which is considered
operative by FPFD can be manually changed to the down state.
Likewise, a path indicated as having failed can be manually
declared UP. This can be accomplished in two ways. First,
the path can be declared UP with an override which excludes
FPFD from again declaring it DOWN. Second, it can simply
be declared UP; in which case FPFD can again declare it
DOWN. Since GN&C paths are reconfigured automatically,
manual changes to these paths are locked out.
Functional paths which are not being tested at
the moment, e.g., de-energized equipment, are assumed
operative. The Status Table assumes a path innocent until
proven guilty.
The Redundancy Management table feeds SCM for
the purpose of checking a minimum equipment/redundancy
complement before continuing to a subsequent mission phase.
FPFD is capable of evaluating the functional path
status using two standards, viz., nominal operation and
emergency operation. This is accomplished by changing the
limit values used in the limit checker. The change is
initiated manually.
SMM performs no limit checks. It accepts all
vehicle and payload data (via Payload Service), scales and/
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or performs engineering unit conversions and displays the
data. Data to be displayed is manually selected. To aid in
data interpretation, a microfilm viewer (not part of SM) is
included as an ancillary item. This viewer could be installed
at the Mission Specialist Station. Applicable view page
numbers are included on SMM and SCM displays.
2.5.1.3 Overlay Structure
The identified processes are considered to be
either core resident or overlay. With regard to the latter,
"overlayable" might be a better term.. It is not intended
that these processes be decreed as overlay, only that if
overlay is exploited and solved now, integration of SM
secondary functions (see Appendix C) will move more smoothly.
The following processes must be resident.
Data Acquisition
FPFD
B/U C&W
SMM
Funct. Path Status Mgt.
SM Performance Mon.
Redundancy Mgt.
Recorder Control
Downlist Control
Payload Service
Uplink Service
Calculations for CM
The following processes are overlay:
SMM
SCM
Displays of CM
TLM Format Select
2.5.2 Selected Processes
This section provides additional detail on those
processes which were most affected by the alternate design.
Some of the operations appearing in the process flow diagrams
may not be required for some implementations. The blocks
have been identified for completeness. No CRT displays are
forced. Each must be called from the keyboard.
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2.5.2.1 Functional Path Fault Detection
A detailed flow of this process is shown in
Figure 2.5.2.1. Starting from the input, functional path
data are received by Precondition Select from Data
Acquisition. Precondition Select, as in the Baseline,
determines whether the specific data are to be processed
based on the functional path configuration. For example,
if a particular functional path is de-energized, that path
would not be examined. Alternatively, if a path were
energized but in a "keep-alive" state, e.g., hydraulics in
the on-orbit phase, a different parameter(s) may be ex-
amined. This functional description of Precondition Select
might be modified in the final application. It is likely
that Precondition Select would direct Data Acquisition as
to the data it actually needs.
There is a counterpart preconditioning function.
This is Precondition Limit Select. Its function is similar
to that above except that it controls the limits used on the
functional path status parameters as determined by system
configuration. The second input to Precondition Limit Select
is the manual Nominal/Emergency limit set select. Due to
the significant reduction in the number of parameters to be
checked, it is expected that both precondition functions
will be simplified from those of the Baseline. This is due
not only to a simple quantity reduction but also to a
sizeable reduction in configuration/parameter interactions
which would have to have been accounted for.
Since functional path faults are being detected,
it is entirely possible that another function will have to
be performed by Precondition Select. This function is
special operations or computations. For example, it may be
determined that the operation of a particular functional path
can best be characterized by the sum of two of its parameters.
Or, that the peak value of a parameter from another path
is best representative of its operation. Such operations
(here summing and peak detecting) would be a part of Pre-
condition Select. If such operations become extensive, a
block following Precondition Select should be included.
The next block in the sequence is the multiplexer
which handles all functional path data from Payload Services.
Payload Services accomplishes its own preconditioning
functions. In operation FPFD would cycle through its
vehicle data and, to maintain design independence, would
enter a Payload cycle. On entering this cycle, Payload data
would be multiplexed in from Payload Service. The data
would be entirely determined by Payload Service.
Limit checking is the next block in Figure 2.5.2.1.
The function of this block is self-explanatory. The limits
can be one-sided or double-sided (high and low). They should
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Figure 2.5.2.1. Functional Path Fault Detection
never, however, be selected to describe more than two
states of a path. Stated another way, limits should be
selected which indicate the bounds between acceptable and
unacceptable operation, not, acceptable-marginal-un-
acceptable. The Nominal/Emergency limit sets have already
been discussed. It is worthy to note that this selection
can also be used by the crew to determine how bad a
functional path is. The Limit Tables simply contain the
set of all limits used throughout the mission, both Nominal
and Emergency. These values are not crew changeable.
There are two inputs to False Alarm Avoidance. One
is the subsystem BITE indications. Depending on the char-
acter of these indications, some may be routed to Precondition
Select for limit checking. The second input to False Alarm
Avoidance is the results of the limit checks. False Alarm
Avoidance or smoothing operates exactly as it did in the
Baseline FDA, i.e., output after "n" consecutive out-limit
indications and not output again until "n" consecutive in-
limit indicators followed by "n" consecutive out-limit
indications. Recall from Section 2.5.1 above that FPFD does
not declare a path good again once it has been declared bad.
Therefore, FPFD does not need this complicated smoother.
The only reason the multiple transitions exist are to drive
the Recorder Control each time the path is declared DOWN.
Since C&W parameters are the only others driving Recorder
Control, this step seemed advisable. The final design will
depend on how much data is needed on the recorder. Further-
more, since the recorder is the only reason for the multiple
transitions, the algorithm should be re-examined for possible
simplification.
The next block in Figure 2.5.2.1 is a Mapper.
This block serves two functions. First, as the name implies,
this operation maps or combines the results of False Alarm
Avoidance into the status of functional paths. For example,
suppose the integrity of a functional path was to be de-
termined by three independent parameters. Suppose further
that if at least one of these parameters were to be declared
bad by False Alarm Avoidance, the path would be .declared
down. The Mapper would perform the implied logical OR in
this example.
The second function of the Mapper is to inhibit
DOWN-to-UP status changes that may be reflected from False
Alarm Avoidance driving the recorder. The Mapper receives
functional path states from the Status Table to.effect this
control. In this way a manual change in the Status Table
will be reflected directly back for re-evaluation. There
is a counterpart to this up-inhibit control. This is the
mode of manual Status Table change which involves a "good"
state override. This will be discussed in the following
paragraphs.
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Status Resolution is the next operation of con-
cern. The function of this block could be thought of as
post-conditioning. To understand the need for this
operation, consider the following situation. Several on-
line functional paths are functionally in series. That is,
each receives outputs from the immediately preceding path.
Now suppose the first functional path fails for some reason.
The next path in the chain could well receive an erroneous
input (or no input). This next path, given its erroneous
input could also be declared bad. And, in principle, this
condition could ripple down the chain. The only path which
failed was the first and this is the information the crew
needs, not the other false indications. The purpose of
Status Resolution, as the name implies, is to resolve such
situations. To do this, the function will require a
Functional Path Map showing how the paths are connected.
It can then reason, based on information flow, the most "up
stream" path and hold the down decisions on subsequent
paths until corrective action is taken on the up stream path.
The problem is not a simple one but it is not as bad as it
first appears. Proper placement of BITE will aid in this
decision process. Furthermore, there appear to be very few
long chains of functional paths on the Orbiter. For strings
of just two paths, an easy way out of this problem is to
ignore Status Resolution and, should the problem arise,
declare both down. The crew can then switch one or the other
to see which corrects the problem. Under such conditions,
both paths would have to be manually declared UP after the
switching action.
There are three other inputs to Status Resolution.
The first comes from the Status Table and consists of a
manually declared UP condition which is also instructed to
be an override. When an override UP is manually entered
into the status table, FPFD cannot declare this path DOWN.
As such, this entry will be the only one read by Status
Resolution. This condition is contrasted to a conventional
UP manual entry which will allow FPFD to again declare the
path DOWN if and when this occurs.
Another input to Status Resolution is the identity
of the functional path which is on line. This input is not
shown in the flow diagram but is derived from Redundancy
Management.
The final input to Status Resolution is the status
of the GN&C subsystems. Manual changes to these indications
are not allowed.
The output of Status Resolution is the resolved or
unconditional status of each functional path. When a path
is declared DOWN, Fault Annunciation accomplishes the distri-
bution and driving necessary to get this condition to the
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several destinations. The first destination is the Status
Table wherein a state change is made. The second source is
the Functional Path Alert Light and tone. The tone and
light are self resetting.
The final destination of Fault Annunciation is a
Fault Summary Display Buffer. Fault Annunciation generates
a display message which identifies the failed path and places
it in the push-down buffer. When the Fault Summary Display
is called by keyboard, the contents of this buffer are dis-
played in order of failure detection time. The purpose of
the Fault Summary Display is to cue the crew about recent
status changes. The Status Display discussed in the next
section provides a complete status picture of the vehicle.
Once the crew is apprised of recent status changes (which
should be few in number) they have no further need for the
display. Once the Fault Summary Display is recalled from
the CRT, the Display Buffer is dumped (except for conditions
which may have taken place during the recall time) to begin
filling again. While the display is on the CRT, additions
to the buffer will be automatically displayed.
2.5.2.2 Status Table and Redundancy Management
A possible format for the Status Display is shown
in Figure 2.5.2.2-1. The purpose of Functional Path Status
Management is to generate/service this display as well as
to manage the Status Table. The display contains the names
of each functional path and their status. Display contents
always remain in the same locations. The status indications
consist of four designators: U, D, UM and U*. These are
identified in the illustration. The legend NOMINAL LIMITS
at the top right indicates these status results are based on
the Nominal Limit set. It is advisable to retain the old
Nominal Limit status table in storage when Emergency Limit
indications are desired. This will give the crew the capa-
bility to switch back for comparison. Only one table
should be active at any one time.
The (P) and (B) on the ARS WATER LOOP legends in-
dicate Primary and Back up. (G) indicates these paths are
under GN&C control and their status cannot be manually
changed.
Figure 2.5.2.2-1 also indicates a possible mech-
anism for entering changes and for paging. To change the
status of a functional path, the line number is keyed in
first followed by the change. For example, to change the
status of ARS WATER LOOP 2 from DOWN to UP with the manual
override option, the crew types in 8 UM. The display will
then show this change which was entered into the Status
Table. Paging is accomplished the same way using the line
number, in this example, of 35. Note that page 4 is indi-
cated as the last page so the crew will not ateempt a page-
forward.
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FUNCTIONAL PATH STATUS
NOMINAL LIMITS
1 HYDRAULIC 1 D 18 (G) TACAN 1 U
2 HYDRAULIC 2 UM 19 (G) TACAN 2 U
3 HYDRAULIC 3 U 20 (G) TACAN 3 U
4 POWER GEN 1 U 21 DACBU 1 U
5 POWER GEN 2 U 22 DACBU 2 U*
6 POWER GEN 3 U
7 ARS WATER LP 1 (P) U
8 ARS WATER LP 2 (B) D
35 Page 4-Last
LEGEND: U - Path UP as declared by FPFD
UM - Path UP as manually declared with override
D -.Path DOWN as declared by FPFD
U* - Path not checked since launch, assumed UP(G) - Designates GN&C equipment, manual status change locked out.
Figure 2.5.2.2-1. Status Display
The purpose of Redundancy Management is best seen
by the display sample in Figure 2.5.2.2-2. Here, the re-
maining vehicle (and payload as necessary) redundancy is
indicated by functional path along with the consequences of.
a lost functional path or paths. The remaining redundancy
is simply a quantity, e.g., 2 of 3, if failure of any
functional path in that set results in identical consequences
or identical loss of capability. Otherwise, the remaining
functional paths are individually identified. In the display
example Hydraulic System number 1 has failed. This results
in loss of nose wheel steering and landing gear actuators.
To aid in crew scan, display entries always appear in the
same location. This display cannot be manually changed.
Display updates are automatically made to an active display.
The display is called by keyboard.
In the sample display, the asterisk by the DACBU
entry has the same meaning it did on the Status Display, i.e.,
at least one of the items has not been checked since launch
and is assumed operative.
The purpose of Redundancy Management is to maintain
the Orbiter Redundancy Tables, store the effects of functional
path loss, generate the Redundancy Remaining Display and keep
track of which functional paths are on line. This latter
item should also be included in the redundancy display.
As a side note, if a convenient implementation can
be devised, it would be beneficial to alert the crew through
FPFD whenever redundancy has degraded to a single functional
path.
2.5.2.3 Back Up C&W
The Back Up C&W process is shown in Figure 2.5.2.3-1.
The precondition functions, limit check and Mapper perform
the same as those for FPFD in Section 2.5.2.1. The Smoothing
operation is entirely different from FPFD. Note it occurs
before the Limit Checking. Before addressing the details of
Smoothing, however, the overall operation should be reviewed.
An out-limit condition detected by C&W will cause a start
signal to be sent to Recorder Control. This condition will
also be annunciated and an entry made in the C&W Out-Limit
Table. This entry will remain in the Out-Limit Table so long
as the condition exists. If the condition becomes back in
limit, for whatever reason, that entry is removed from the
table. The table contents may be viewed at any time using
the Back Up C&W display. The C&W display is called by a
single, dedicated key on the keyboard. The display is de-
scribed in more detail below.
The smoothing operation used here is a first-order
recursive smoother. Limit decisions are made on these
smoothed results. Grossly speaking, the recursive filter
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POWER GEN 3 OF 3
ARS WATER LP B/U
TACAN 3 OF 3
DACBU 2 OF 2*
Figure 2.5.2.2-2. Redundancy Management Display
To Recorder Control
From Payload Service LIMIT CANNED
TABL MESSAGES
To B/U
C&W C&W Light >
Data COND. MUX SMOOTH- IMIT CH MAPPER ALARM
SELECT ING (DEC.) GEN. To C&W Display
PRECON- PRECON- C&W
SMOOTHING DITION DITION OUT-LIMIT
LIMIT MAP TABLE
SELECT MODIF.
Configur ation Data, C&W
THIS PROCESS IS FULL TIME RESIDENT
Figure 2.5.2.3-1. Backup C&W Process
behaves very much like a single-pole low pass analog
filter. It weighs each new sample by the smoothing con-
stant and sums this result with the weighted value of all
previous samples. It can be seen that this mechanization
is not equivalent to a moving window averaging device
commonly seen in these applications. In fact, it requires
less storage than the moving window or running average
technique. Since the smoother is essentially a low pass
filter, it can be used to decrease both false alarms and
repeated alarms with no increase in complexity. As with
the post-decision smoother used in FPFD, this smoother will
require initialization. Initialization can be effected by
two extremes. First, nominal values of each parameter can
be used for initial values to start the recursion. This re-
quires a complete complement of nominal values be stored but
results in a very short transient response -- usually one
step. The second method is to ignore initial values and
let the smoother reach a steady state. This does not require
storage but could take anywhere from 10 to 80 steps to be-
come stable. The number of steps depends on the value of
the smoothing constant, the initial value and the range of
the check limits.
A good compromise to the initialization extremes
is to initialize the smoother such that it is always
"saturated" in the "good" region. For C&W this could be
done with probably less than a dozen values. For example,
consider a parameter which has an upper limit of +8000 on
the PCM scale and a nominal value of +3000 (no lower limit).
Initializing the smoother for this parameter at zero will
certainly decrease the possibility of initial transients
triggering a false alarm. In addition, if the subsystem
from which this parameter originated had just been turned
on, this technique would allow time for the hardware to
settle.
A Back-UP C&W display is shown in Figure 2.5.2.3-2.
This display is composed from the C&W Out-Limit Table and
driven by the Back Up C&W Alarm Generator. Both the table
and the display are fixed location, i.e., entries are not
moved or pushed down. This allows the crew to become
accustomed to a location for a given condition. The display
consists of one page, double column.and it cannot be manually
changed. Operationally, when an out-limit condition exists,
that condition, or group of conditions, is/are entered into
the Out-Limit Table and the B/U C&W light is illuminated.
The crew will then call the B/U C&W Display by its dedicated
key. The display will show all conditions which are out-
limit, including some from past alerts. The current condi-
tions will be indicated by a "bug" adjacent to the entry.
When the crew depresses ACKNOWLEDGE, the bug is removed. The
display will reflect condition changes from the table so
long as it is active.
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C&W
APU 1 OVR TEMP A
LOW CBN OX PP
P/L OVR CURRENT A
A - Indicates condition has not been acknowledged
Figure 2.5.2.3-2. Back Up C&W Display
2.5.2.4 Subsystem Measurement Management (SMM)
The SMM process is shown in Figure 2.5.2.4-1. The
process operates in two basic modes: Scan and Evaluate.
The operation of these processes will become obvious in the
discussion of SMM displays below. SMM is in effect no
more than a mechanism for displaying Orbiter data. The pro-
cess has access to all vehicle (and payload as applicable)
data. In each of the above operating modes, the crew can
call standard pages or identify specific parameters to be
displayed. Achieving this option is the purpose of the first
third of the process.
The SMM displays for each operating mode are
shown in Figure 2.5.2.4-2. The display values cannot be
manually changed. Each display is manually called from the
keyboard. The displays are automatically updated so long
as they are active. In the Scan Mode, a bar display is used.
If any bar falls below the left hash line or above the right
hash line, that parameter is out of nominal limits. The
crew need only scan the bars to detect this condition and
can rapidly page through a large list. The bars not only
indicate out-limit conditions but also the extent of this
condition. Marginal in-limit parameters may also be detected.
Note that the bars start at three different places.
This is to accommodate the three versions of parameter limit
conditions: upper limit only, lower limit only and two-
sided limits. Upper limit parameters are scaled such that
the left hash line represents the minimum PCM count. They
can, therefore, never go below this line. Lower limit
parameters are scaled such that the maximum PCM count corre-
sponds to the right hash line. Two-sided parameters are
scaled between these two extremes. In the case of the
latter two, two different origins are defined to the left
of the lower hash line.
The scan display contains (at bottom) the micro-
film viewer page number where this subsystem block diagram is
found. Note that discretes are not shown. They appear on
the Evaluate Display shown in Figure 2.5.2.4-2(b).
When the corresponding Evaluate Display is called,
it will contain quantitative information in engineering units
about parameters which were in the Scan Display. In addition,
it will contain the state of all applicable switches, valves,
heaters, etc. (the discretes).
The preceding described the page operation in both
SMM modes. For purposes of correlating parameters on differ-
ent displays, the crew may define a display in either mode
by entering the desired mode and the parameter ID numbers
recorded from the page operation.
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Figure 2.5.2.4-1. Subsystem Measurement Management
S/S NAME Page 1735 S/S NAME Page 173E
ID NAME LIMITS Units
063 ID NAME VALUE LO HI
064 065 685 - 600 PSIG
065 067 18 25 40 GPM
066 070 OPN
067 071 ON
068 073 OFF
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078 CLSD
S/S Block 42
(a) Scan Mode (b) Evaluate Mode
Parameters 065 and 067
are out of limits.
Parameters 063, 067 and 069
have lower and upper limits.
Parameters 064, 065 and 068
have only upper limits.
Parameter 069 has only a
lower limit.
Figure 2.5.2.4-2. SMM Displays
2.5.2.5 Consumables Management
The flow diagram for this process is shown in
Figure 2.5.2.5. The primary purpose for this diagram is
to indicate the overlay option. The process of calculating
consumables, e.g., PVT computations and table update, must
be resident and operate in real- or near-real-time. Con-
sumables consumption records must be available for the
consumables displays and current consumables levels should
be available to Configuration Monitoring. The rate at which
the consumables level is updated is considered to be a
programmable entry. This value could vary from once every
five minutes to once every two hours. A call for Configuration
Monitoring should initiate an immediate calculation.
2.5.2.6 Subsystem Configuration Monitoring (SCM)
This process is essentially the same as that of
the Baseline, only its content has been increased. This is
best described by the Configuration Monitoring Exceptions
Display which is shown in Figure 2.5.2.6. This display lists
all exceptions encountered in a check against a predefined
checklist. The display is called, which in turn calls SCM,
and the checklist ID is entered. This initiates the con-
figuration check. In implementation, a READY indication on
the display would be advisable when the process is ready
for the checklist ID. The sample display identifies the ID
of the configuration checklist being used as well as the
exceptions. Beside each exception is listed the CRT page
number for the applicable SMM display as well as the corre-
sponding microfilm view page number on which the block
diagram can be found. Note that the exceptions contain not
only switch/valve positions but also consumables and re-
dundancy information.
The second entry in the display has a question mark
entered to the right of the condition. To explain this
notation it will be necessary to recall that SCM will repli-
cate its checks, say, 10 times. Of the displayed exceptions,
all checked as disagreements all ten times except for OMS
PORT SIDE OXIDIZER. This value disagreed at least once but
not all ten times. The condition should be checked by the
crew using the page index to the right of the display.
Alternatively, they can reinitiate the SCM check.
2-36
To Configuration Mgt.
Mission Time
Overlay
Update Rate Full Time
Resident
Vehicle Consumables Data NOMINAL
Payload Consumables Data CALCULATIONS HISTORY COANSUAFEIONAND TABLED SAFE
From Payload Service TABLE MGT. RETURN TABLES
Keyboard Call & Consumable ID To Displa
GENERATOR
Figure 2.5.2.5. Consumables Management
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Figure 2.5.2.6. Configuration Monitoring Display
D DIS.-
AUEUE PLAY
T VEHICLE C&W DATA BACK UP To SERV.
A C &W  B/U C&W LIGHTF SM
A VEHICLE C&W CONFIGURATION DATA PERFORMANCEMONITOR
Q To MAINT. REC.
U VEHICLE RECORDER
I FUNCT. PATH CONFIG. DATA CONTROL To LO)P REC. 1 S HARD WIRE
I_ _To C&W PANEL
T VEHICLE FUNC. To ALERT LIGHT F MISSION PHASE FLAGS
IPATH BITE DATA FUNCTIONAL F MISSION PHASE FLAGS To
N PATH FAULT FAULT PATH IDsO (From MISSION EVENT SM PROESSES IO
VEHICLE _E NCT. DETECTION PLAY CONT. INPPATH O/I DATA SERV. TIME FLAG
To.
KEYBOARD MANUAL DOWNLI T ACTIVE
SERVICE SELECT/. CONTROl, DACBU
LIMIT SET SEL. FUNCTIONALC KEYBOARD MANUAL STATUS CHANGE 0 PATH STATUS REDUNDANCYSERVICE MANAGEMENT O LI
GN&C DATA
0 SUBSYSTEM DISPLAY
ALL VEHICLE MEASUREMENT SERVICE LOCALD 0/I DATA MANAGEMENT S LOCAL
From A z EXEC/CONT
1OP S T a I
A ALL VEHICLE F
CONFIGURATION DATA AUXILIARY FILM
A LPA E R DEIS PLAY/LS
C (ADDRESS)
U SUBSYSTEM F
I I FCONFIGURTION - R DISPLAY FSNAS: I MONITORING SERVICE __ KEYBOARD MANUAL
I VEHICLE 0SERVICE To DACBU's
T CONSUMABLES DATA CONSUMABLES DISPLAY O 0TLM O
I MANAGEMENT SERVICE FORMAT DISPLOIII SSELECT AY ToSs AUTO.E SERVICE S IOP
NMISSION PHASE VLAG
B/U COW (From MISSION ENT CONT.)
ALL PAYLOAD DATA PAYLOAD To SM FDA To SM
0 SERVICE SMM EXEC. &
CM PROCESSES
SCM
UMBILICAL DATA/COMMANDS UPLINK
RF
KEYBOARD PAYLOAD 1ATA/COMMANDS
I
S E R V I C E  
P >COMMANDING
NOTES
,- (ITHIS PROCESS/FUNCTION THIS FUNCTION IS EXTERNAL
IS OPTIONAL TO SM. TO THE CPU. PAGE ADDRESSES
THIS PROCESS CN BE ARE PASSED TO CREW ON DISPLAYS.
UNIQUELY PARTITIONED FIGURE 2.5. FUNCTIONAL FLOW DIAGRAM,-AIlTERNATIVE SM DESIGN
ORIGINAL PAGE la ORIGINAL PAGE IS
FOLOUT FRAME OF POOR QUALITY FODOUT FRAME OF POOR QUALITY
OFPOR Uo rFRM
3.0 IMPLEMENTATION ASSESSMENT - THE DESIGNER
VIEWPOINT
The purpose of this section is to contrast the
implementation aspects of the alternative design presented
in Section 2.5 with those of the Baseline design in Appendix
B to this volume. Since implementation specifications are
available for neither of the designs, implementation per
se can certainly not be evaluated. This assessment might
be more appropriately termed "implementation-ability," or
an assessment of how readily one design can be turned into
a viable, mature product over the other. Four factors will
be used in the determination and the two designs will be
contrasted for each factor. These factors are:
* Technical Risk - The likelihood that an
implementation cannot be realized within
budget and/or on time.
* Flexibility - The ability of the design to
accommodate changes in requirements and in
the design itself. Since SM has a rather
special application, features which enhance
multi-use or generality are not considered
to be of benefit.
* Growth Potential - the ability of the design
to systematically accept additional require-
ments - both projected and unprojected.
Emphasis must be placed on projected require-
ments.
* Reliability - the fault-free tendency of the
software design.
It is obvious that the two designs will have to be
compared on common terms. It will be necessary to assume
that both designs will be implemented in the same hardware/
software environment and that they will have identical soft-
ware constraints. For example, if the Baseline is imple-
mented with a C&W function in the GN&C computers, the
alternative design would also be implemented in this hard-
ware partition. If the Baseline is coded in HAL, so too
will be the alternative. FCOS is assumed common to both
designs.
It should be pointed out that the evaluations in
this section will, of necessity, be independent of the
suitability of each design as contrasted in Section 2.0.
The intent here, as the section title implies, is to contrast
the implementation pros and cons of two designs. Is one
harder than the other, riskier than the other? Whether one
design is operationally more appropriate than the other
should not enter into the assessment.
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3.1 Technical Risk Assessment
It is appropriate to begin by asking what makes
a design a technical risk? Factors which are immediately
brought to mind are requirements for state-of-the-art
techniques, likelihood of using core/CPU capacity, lack of
interface definition, likelihood of exceeding I/O capacity,
extensive operator interaction, lack of processing defi-
nition, necessity for sophisticated algorithms, dependency
on other hardware/software designs and implied extensive
analysis of data to achieve defined processing.
Neither design will require state-of-the-art soft-
ware techniques. Both should be rather straightforward
implementations. This is not meant to imply, however, that
no technical risk exists in the integration of SM. Orbiter
software, all other terminology not withstanding, can only
be classified as operating in a multiprocessor, multi-
programming, real-time environment. Such environments are
not known for their lack of technical risk. To restate the
initial claim above, there is no reason to believe that
the designs for SM proper will pose a coding challenge and
both should experience about the same integration risk.
CPU loading, core requirements and I/O loading
can be lumped into a single data processing resource assess-
ment. The implementation overlay structure will be one of
the factors which influences I/O loading and core utiliza-
tion. The problem is simple, the more programs/data which
are resident, the less the I/O peak traffic. Or alternatively,
'the shorter will be the delay for program/display execution.
This latter point is significant on two counts for SM soft-
ware. First, the Mass Store is implemented with magnetic
tape and is inherently slow. Second, at least one version
of FCOS will allow a program to become resident or be posted
upon call without its data being in core. It cannot become
active until data also resides and the data fetch must wait
in the core allocator priority queue. Neither of these
characteristics is inherently poor, they are mentioned only
to indicate a strong motivation for total residency.
Is core a problem if SM is totally resident? IBM has
made core estimates for the Baseline Design. Applying a safety
margin to these estimates it seems likely that SM can be imple-
mented in 60K -words.* Based on the same estimates, FCOS and
software housekeeping should require no more than 40K -words
and COMPOOL no more than 6K -words. Total available core is
128K -words. Conclusion -no problem when SM is implemented
*Source: "Space Shuttle Orbiter Avionics Software Flight
Software Memory Sizing and CPU Loading Estimates," IBM, FSD,
October 1, 1974.
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in a processor independent of GN&C. The above estimate
includes all operating tables but no display formats.
What about the alternative design? The alternative design
has very little crew interaction and no more displays than
the Baseline. Precondition steering and fault annunciation
should be simplified even though some duplication of these
functions exists. The alternative design adds the new
function of status resolution in addition to two new tables.
The latter are the Functional Path Status Table and the
Redundancy Management Table. The additional processing code
for these added features should absorb the reduction in
complexity elsewhere. What is left are the tables for the
added functions. If the Baseline can be implemented in
60K -words, the alternative design should require no more
than 67K -words. This too poses no problem.
When consideraing CPU loading, there is a CORE/
CPU trade which can become significant, especially for soft-
ware with a high content of tables such as SM. This trade
centers around core bit packing for program constants.
Storing discretes, for example, as complete -words re-
quires more core but eliminates CPU masking operations and
thus reduces loading. Packing tables into core has the
opposite effect. To avoid this additional variable in the
assessment, it will be assumed that the two designs would
be treated approximately the same in this regard. This
assumption is not without foundation since the table
structure for both is quite similar. The difference be-
tween CPU loading of the two designs can now be evaluated
on the basis of required execution rates. Both designs
will handle the same number of parameters. A significant
reduction in operations on these parameters, however, is
seen in the alternative design. Here only one fifth of the
parameters are being limit checked. This reduces not only
the checking operation but false alarm avoidance and pre-
conditioning. This becomes particularly noteworthy when
one considers these operations to be routine or cyclic in
nature. In addition, the alternative design can be imple-
mented to exploit these savings even farther. Since SMM,
a demand operation, only needs the bulk of input data
when it is active, data acquisition for SMM could be
dispensed with when the process is not active. This will
reduce the average load but possibly have little effect on
the peak load. The processes which have been added to the
alternative design require CPU time only in the event of
a functional path failure or a table call-up. It can then
be stated that if the Baseline Design operates within a
safe CPU loading limit, the alternative design will
comfortably do so.
Extensive operator interaction always adds risk to
software development. This is not meant to imply that
operator interaction is uncommon in designs, only that
achieving a successful design requires care, additional
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storage and often times extensive algorithms. Program/
storage protection and lockouts must be implemented,
especially if changes to the data base are allowed. A
repertoire of illegal entries and a scheme for checking
these will be required. To prevent the program from
possibly acting on old and new (just entered) data at the
same time, break points may be required in the code and
certain programs may either cause the CPU to wait (pending
a response) or relinquish their execution. System responses
to the operator will have to be contrived and these should
include notification of delays and acknowledgements. All
this adds risk. And, the more extensive the interaction, the
more the complications. Operator interaction in the alter-
native design is considerably less than that for the Baseline
and does not include changes to the data base. The alterna-
tive design is a good deal less risky with regard to operator
interaction.
To the extent that lack of interface definition
causes risk, it can only be said that both designs will
suffer equally in this regard.
With regard to dependency on other hardware/soft-
ware designs, both designs rank approximately the same.
The alternative design, with additional separation of
functions, should experience less of an impact from changes.
For the purposes of this assessment, the factors
regarding sophisticated algorithms and extensive data analysis
to achieve processing can be combined. First, neither design
will require sophisticated algorithms or extensive data
analysis. It cannot be ignored, however, that even though
the Baseline will require additional data analysis by way of
precondition steering, limits and false alarm values, the
alternative design will require a good deal of additional
investigation in two areas. These are the development of
functional path performance measures to be used for fault
detection and the algorithms for status resolution. Not only
will the performance measures have to be defined but their
limits and false alarm constants as well. In this respect
the alternative design presents more technical risk. There
is simply more to define.
On the whole, the two designs represent approximately
the same technical risk with one exception. The alternative
design will require additional data analysis and algorithm
development. This is not to say that there is excessive risk
in technically achieving this development. The risk of
achieving the alternative design within original cost and
schedule is greater. The extent of this risk can best be
grasped by considering that Functional Path Fault Detection
represents 10 to 15 percent of the total design effort. This
proportion considers the, approximately, 200 parameters it
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checks as well as its complexity compared to the remainder
of SM.
3.2 Flexibility Assessment
Factors which influence flexibility are modularity,
excess core/CPU capacity, the operating system, code branch-
ing disciplines, use of a higher level language and the
extent to which the code is table driven. Not considered
to be a factor in flexibility is the ability to interact
with program constants and data base from a CRT/keyboard.
Such interaction is an operations policy. That is, it is a
way of altering program data in an operational environment,
not necessarily a software flexibility factor.
It has been presumed that both the Baseline and
alternative designs will be developed under the same software
environment. Thus, effects of a higher level language, i.e.,
HAL, and the operating system on flexibility will be the
same for both.
Of the two designs, the alternative design is
more modular. The modularity is more than an additional
dividing of the processes, it provides functional isolation;
C&W is separated from functional path alerts which are in
turn separated from the gross problem of manual parameter
evaluations. It is less likely that changes will affect all
these areas and a change to one has a limited effect on the
others. Design of the individual processes can be more
directly related to requirements. The Baseline groups C&W
and alerts under one operation and the manual parameter
evaluation is also tied to this common process. With the
in-flight data base change capability, the motives for such
an approach are reasonable. The approach is, nonetheless,
less flexible due to lack of modularity.
It is reasonable to group the factors of code
branching disciplines and table driven code under a single
assessment since they affect the finer structure of design.
Branching disciplines deal with assembly code and the
methods used to handle program branches. If these operations
are not restricted to specific blocks of code, the end re-
sult can resemble a spider web and is very hard to change.
Since the Baseline and alternative designs will be applied
under similar software environments, design control for
each should be the same. The additional modularity in the
alternative design will tend to force some control over
branching and is considered to be inherently more flexible
in this regard.
The Baseline Design exploits table driven code.
This is a definite flexibility asset in that only the tables
need be changed to effect numerical (including flags)
changes. While not explicitly stated in the alternative
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design description, this same technique should be carried
throughout. There is no inherent property of the alterna-
tive design which would restrict this in the slightest.
In fact, some of the original tables would be partitioned
which would ease changes somewhat and provide a separation
of change responsibility.
From Section 3.1, the alternative design will use
more core than the Baseline and less CPU capacity. There is
still, however, ample core and for a real time system, CPU
capacity is usually more critical. (CPU capacity is more
critical from the standpoint that it is harder to get a
handle on during design and the average capacity should
rarely exceed 70% or so if a peak safety factor is to be
realized.) Balancing these two factors, the alternative
design is considered to be more flexible than the Baseline.
In summary, it must be concluded that when all
flexibility f,actors are considered, the alternative design
is inherently more flexible than the Baseline.
3.3 Growth Potential Assessment
This assessment considers the ability of the de-
signs to systematically accept additional requirements,
especially those which have been projected. From Appendix
C, three projected requirements are:
Mission Profile Storage and Retrieval
Performance Evaluation and Trend Analysis
Contingency Planning Aid
The factors which affect Growth Potential are the
same as those affecting flexibility. These are not going
to be reiterated and the conclusions reached in Section 3.2
will apply here. The following material will discuss some
additional features of the alternative design which have
a bearing on growth potential.
Overlay. If the projected requirements identi-
fied above are to be planned for, core is an obvious
consideration. The software overlay problem should be
solved during the initial design so there will be more
latitude to introduce the growth requirements. The projected
functions are primarily demand functions. As such, they
will require some resident core but considerably more core
overlay area. Within the bounds of CPU loading and peak
I/O traffic, demand operations in the present design should
be designated as overlay to increase the growth potential.
It is recognized that CPU loading will vary with mission
phase and this must be considered in the overlay-I/O problem.
Some contentions can simply be solved by operating procedures.
The fact remains, however, that if overlay poses an I/O prob-
lem now, it is difficult to see how this is going to get
better when demands for overlay increase.
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The additional modularity of the alternative
design makes it more "overlayable" than the Baseline with
a lower minimum residency requirement. This is considered
to be an advantage over the Baseline.
The alternative design inherently reduces routine
I/O. In light of the foregoing, the advantages of this
are obvious. The underlying reason, however, is subtle
and will require some explanation. The Baseline uses a
"pump-up" scheme for false alarm avoidance. Furthermore,
this operation is applied to a large number of subsystem
parameters. To achieve acceptable false alarm and repeated
alarm rates, the counts used in false alarm avoidance will
likely be large. This in turn causes extrapolated response
times, especially in the C&W area. In an attempt to re-
duce response time, the sample rates are correspondingly
increased. Now, what about the alternative design? First,
the number of parameters which are being limit checked is
significantly reduced. This decreases the aggregate
problem of false alarms. Second, C&W is using an improved
false alarm avoidance or smoothing technqiue which will not
demand corresponding increase in sample rate. In short,
both the quantity of limit checks and the smoothing tech-
nique used affect the sample rate. This rate will be in-
herently lower for the alternative design.
A final feature of the alternative design has to
do with the projected requirement of trend analysis. Trend
analysis falls under the body of practices known as fore-
casting. Before pursuing the details, a general observation
should be made. It is very unlikely that viable forecasting
can be developed and implemented for every subsystem param-
eter aboard Orbiter (and payload). Such analysis typically
requires comparatively large amounts of data storage and,
for large numbers of independent parameters, a wide variety
of equations matched to the underlying processes.
Returning to the alternative design trend analysis
feature, attention should be directed toward the added C&W
smoothing technique. Recall that this technique employs
recursive smoothing. Recursive smoothing is a vital portion
of virtually any forecasting implemented on a digital com-
puter. As such, one of the principal ingredients of one
projected requirement already exists. And, it exists in
the area which is likely to receive the most attention in
trend analysis. It is not possible to utilize the current
Baseline false alarm avoidance techniques in trend analysis.
Recapping the growth potential contrasts of the
Baseline and alternative designs, the alternative is clearly
superior.
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3.4 Reliability Assessment
Factors affecting software reliability are
currently the subject of heated debates in the industry.
Without fear of too much wrath, it can be stated that these
factors all seem to stem from three sources: complexity of
the design, ability to control the design:and ability to
test the end product.
With respect to design complexity, it is diffi-
cult to determine a significant difference between the two
designs. The extensive operator interaction in the Baseline
Design adds complexity over the alternative. On the other
hand, the status resolution operation and two new tables
in the alternative design add more functions but not
necessarily a corresponding increase in complexity. The
complexity of the Baseline will be slightly more than the
alternative design.
The ability to control and test a design directly
relates to design partition, the independence of the
partitioned members and the number of space/time states
the design can assume. Since both designs are accomplishing
essentially the same function using identical data sets, the
number of space/time states should be approximately the same
for both. The alternative design has not only more partitions
but these partitions are a good deal more independent than
those of the Baseline. The alternative design is, then,
somewhat more inherently reliable than the Baseline.
3.5 Assessment Summary
In contrasting the Baseline Design to the alterna-
tive design, the following has been concluded:
* Inherently, the alternative design will re-
sult in somewhat improved flexibility and
reliability.
* Inherently, the alternative design has a good
deal more growth potential.
* Inherently, the Baseline Design represents a
somewhat reduced technical risk when considering
SM implementation alone. This result certainly
should not be extrapolated to the larger context
of Shuttle technical risk.
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4.0 SOME SPECIAL TOPICS
Contained in this section is a collection of in-
dependent analyses which were used in support of the fore-
going assessments. Volume II of this report contains
extensive material used in support of the alternative
Functional Path Fault Detection design.
4.1 Treatment of False Alarms
Before this subject can be properly addressed, it
will be necessary to make some further distinctions. The
treatment of false alarms has two parts: ways of avoiding
them in the first place and ways of handling those which
cannot ultimately be avoided. Each of these can be further
decomposed into procedural treatments and mechanized treat-
ments. An example of a mechanized avoidance treatment is the
False alarm avoidance technique used in the Baseline Design.
It should become obvious in the following discussions that
the reason for this segmentation is that each of the four
ways of treating the problem varies significantly in approach
and system responsibility from the other three. Each method
will be addressed below.
4.1.1 Mechanized Avoidance
This method of treating false alarms deals with
hardware/software implementations which seek to eliminate, or
at least reduce, the occurrence of false alarms. In a digital
computer implementation, false alarms can come from three
sources: (a) numerical/analog anomalies, (b) sample time vari-
ation or jitter due to random processor delays and (c), control
transients due to state/data disagreements which occur in any
sequential process such as a computer. The first source is
the one most commonly recognized and the one which receives
the greatest attention. The second involves variation in the
time at which data samples are actually used in a decision,
i.e., the decisions are not always made on samples exactly T
seconds apart. The delay can come from the usual multiplexing
phenomena but the most serious delays can be caused by bus or
I/O contention and processor interrupt servicing. This error
source is treated further in Section 8.0 of Volume II. Suffice
it to say that, although the identified delay sources can rep-
resent large delays, their occurrence should be infrequent.
The final source of false alarms, control transients,
has to do with the problem of "state" data which results from
sequential operation. The computer does not "see" things
all at one time. Its inputs are scattered over a complete
cycle of input data scan. Thus, its decisions are not always
based on correlated or up to date information. This subject
is treated in more detail in Section 4.3 below and can be
considered for present purposes to be simply a source of
false alarms.
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To reduce false alarms, effects of the above
sources should be reduced and the final mechanization must
be able to cope with the effects which are left. The most
obvious mechanized method of reducing false alarms, and the
one given most attention here, is to filter out or smooth
the remaining errors. That is, attempt to present to the
decision mechanism information which closely approximates
the "true" value of the parameter in question.
Two methods of achieving parameter smoothing will
be discussed. There are obviously others but the two selected
are the most promising. These methods have been identified
as predecision smoothing and postdecision smoothing. Concepts
of these techniques are discussed in Section 8.0 of Volume II
to this report. The intent of this discussion is not to re-
peat that material but rather to briefly describe each smoother
and to address their implementation requirements. Each is
implemented in software.
The predecision smoother addressed here is a re-
cursive smoother, and in particular a first order or exponen-
tial smoother. Its purpose is to smooth the raw parameter
values before decisions are made. Decisions of the limit
checker are considered to be the state of the parameter.
The postdecision smoother operates differently.
This device smooths by counting replicated decisions of a
preceding limit checker. Many algorithms regarding the treat-
ment of the decision replications are possible. The most
simple, however, will be discussed. It is:
* Declare parameter BAD if N consecutive out-limit
decisions are received.
* Once declared BAD, declare parameter GOOD again
if N consecutive in-limit decisions are received.
Implementations of these two smoothing methods are
pictorially represented in Figures 4.1.1-1 and 4.1.1-2. The
predecision smoother must store two values, the smoothing
constant, a, and the previously smoothed result. The indi-
cated operation is performed on each sample; i.e., three
Multiplies and two Adds.
The postdecision smoother must store three values,
the previous output, the smoothing parameter, N, and the
previous M-count. The method, as expected, is predominately
logic. While it requires more program steps than the pre-
decision smoother, not all the steps are used for each
sample. If the parameter remains within limits the top-most
path is taken and only a few rapidly executable steps are
performed. On the other hand, if the parameter is approach-
ing its threshold, in-limit indications will begin to be
punctuated by out-limit decisions due to errors. The method
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can then become quite busy. Also, as the number of parameters
being checked increases, the higher will be the probability
that the method will, on the average, consume more time than
the minimal.
In contrasting the two methods, each can be imple-
mented in a half-dozen ways. Also, the detail of accessing
tables is not shown. Furthermore, it is difficult to predict
how much average time will be consumed by the postdecision
smoother. There is, then, little point in attempting actual
CPU time estimates. It can be concluded that the predecision
smoother can be implemented using less core than the post-
decision smoother. And, on the whole, the postdecision
smoother will execute more rapidly than the predecision
smoother. For a very large number of parameters, the re-
duction in CPU loading using the postdecision smoother will
be significant. This case represents a very strong imple-
mentation argument for postdecision smoothing. On the other
hand, if a few (say 100) parameters are being considered, the
CPU loading difference will often wash out or be taken care
of by other factors. Under these circumstances it is
reasonable to consider the two more on the basis of perform-
ance than on CPU loading.
Before turning to another subject, initialization
of these methods should be discussed. Each method will re-
quire one value to be initialized. For the postdecision
smoother this value is M. The solution here is easy, set all
M's equal zero. The predecision smoother requires an
initial value for its output (D in the figure). This value
will require more consideration. Basically, parameters can
be considered as having 2-sided limits, lower limits and upper
limits. The initial condition for D must fall well within
the good range of these limits. An approach to the 1-sided
limits is to use two initial values, one which covers all
upper limits and one which covers all lower limits. The 2-
sided limits remain and they have to be solved on an in-
dividual basis. One of the drawbacks of this method is the
initialization for a wide variety of parameters. In the
worst case an initial value will have to be defined for each
parameter. The only thing that keeps this from becoming a
serious contention problem with the postdecision smoother is
that the initial values do not have to be stored in core.
4.1.2 Procedural Avoidance
What can be done procedurally to reduce false
alarms? Several sources of false alarms were identified in
Section 4.1.1. There is another which was implied but not ex-
plicitly mentioned. This source is the sheer number of
decisions which are made. If 1,000 parameters are each
being checked twice per second, this amounts to one billion
decisions on a seven day mission. Are they all necessary?
Without belaboring the obvious calculations, it is reasonable
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to expect that the more decisions that are made, the higher
the likelihood of a false alarm. These decisions can be re-
duced in two ways. First, make decisions on fewer parameters.
Second, of the parameters which are being checked, some
portion will not require checking all the time. Such param-
eters can be spot checked at scheduled points in the mission.
When on orbit, once a day checks may be reasonable for some
parameters with very little reduction in crew information.
These parameters could be deleted from the routine checking
process and checked by a demand (manually initiated) process
similar to Subsystem Configuration Monitoring.
4.1.3 Mechanized Handling
The preceding material dealt with ways of avoiding
false alarms. This, and the next, section deal with ways of
handling those alarms which cannot be avoided. Of interest
here are hardware/software implementations.
If one is depending on a machine to make decisions,
the least that can be asked is that it "tell" you when it is
in doubt about its results. In fact, one may not be too
concerned about the failure of such a machine so long as it
announces that failure. This idea generally falls under the
heading of "no information is better than bad information."
To carry this argument one step further, it would not be un-
reasonable to define this machine as having failed only when
it faulted and did not announce that fact.
The foregoing was intended to construct a perform-
ance measure for SM which focused on the handling of false
alarms (and other errors). If performance were judged in
this fashion, design interest would not be far behind. Any
decision mechanism needs a way to check itself. The extent
of this checking, and the cost which it warrants, depends on
the extent to which the results can be corroborated by the
crew and the criticality of the decision. These are the
subject of Section 4.1.4 below and will not be pursued here.
It is far better to have an error indication for each de-
cision made. This will allow the crew to pick and choose while
having the use of all decisions which are not in question.
Such an approach can get costly and it assumes that all the
decisions are independent. This latter point is seldom the
case. In the final analysis, individual error indications
are powerful and are practical on a limited basis for selected
parameters. They are seldom practical when applied at large.
A compromise to this situation is to incorporate a
single error indication. This notifies the crew to be
cautious of all results and critical results, if not handled
individually, can be double-checked. The duration of the
error condition is also of interest. This implies that the
self check has to be recoverable, i.e., when (and if) the
error condition disappears, the indication should also
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extinguish. A natural response to an error indication is to
wait and see how long it lasts. If it is transitory, the
results for that period are simply ignored. If it lasts for
an extended period, the machine likely has a persistent
problem and the crew can decide whether to continue, after
further checks, using partial results or simply turn it off.
A drawback to this technique is that, should another anomaly
occur while the error indicator is on, the condition will go
unannounced. The crew must, then, treat all results with
care.
Implementation of a self-test for SM will involve
an error recognition scheme as well as a CPU/IOP self-test.
This latter test will undoubtedly exploit the IBM CPU self-
test routines. One of the most important requirements for
the self-test is that its results do not get handled by the
software it is checking. The error indication must be a
hardwire to a panel indicator.
A simplified and reasonably comprehensive alterna-
tive to the above self-test is described in Appendix A. This
method is best used to augment the self-test and at the same
time justify its simplification.
4.1.4 Procedural Handling
Within the bounds of crew workload, it is important
to be able to corroborate SM decisions manually. Whether or
not SM or GN&C find the control surfaces operative, the crew
will test their response before leaving orbit. So long as
an emergency situation does not exist, the crew should have
the capability to corroborate a majority of SM results in a
similar fashion. This can be done by observing effects on
their panel instrumentation (especially those not software
driven) or monitoring SMM displays. Since SMM is in fact
serving in this corroborative role, it should (a) be free of
machine-made decisions and (b), be easy to use. Once the
crew has detected an SM error, they should have a means of
either manually correcting it or identifying it as erroneous.
Manual checking of SM results is reliable and
simplifies design (see Section 4.1.3). It cannot, however,
be totally relied upon. Manual verification takes time, and
if an emergency exists, time may be a precious commodity.
SM should be of the most value when the crew is the busiest.
In this regard, critical results, such as C&W should employ
the schemes outlined in Section 4.1.3.
4.2 Treatment of Off-Line Items
What is an off-line item? For the purposes of this
discussion, an off-line item is a functional path in a re-
dundant network which has been "switched" out of the active
functional role. In contrast, the on-line item(s) is/are
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performing the work of the function: moving data, generating
electrical power, controlling actuators or whatever. Off-
line items are in effect spares or backup for on-line items.
Aboard Orbiter, unless the off-line item needs to be con-
stantly updated to allow rapid take over of the on-line job,
it will usually be powered down to conserve consumables.
The subject this section wishes to address is how
off-line items can be checked to verify operation. Before
continuing, however, it seems obvious to ask why these items
need be checked at all. They were checked just before launch
and presumably found satisfactory. The stress of a launch
plus the. environmental extremes of space are the two most
significant factors causing concern about off-line items. In
addition, the crew should know the status of each functional
path that will possibly be used in an up-coming mission phase
before committing to that phase. Aside from identifying the
needs, the preceding statement makes another important point.
Thht point is that the crew does not need off-line status all
the time, only at predefined points need this status be re-
checked and updated. This point establishes the underlying
approach to checking of off-line items - schedule their
checking similar to the process/procedure used in Subsystem
Configuration Monitoring (SCM). Such a checking scheme could
be made a part of SCM. What if the crew switches in a
functional path which has failed since it was checked? The
consequences of this depend on the criticality of the
functional path. For noncritical paths (alert class), the
crew will quickly discover the path has failed and switch to
the next. If the status of each on-line functional path is
being directly checked, the crew will be notified immediately
and unambiguously of this condition. Since GN&C employs
automatic fault recovery, these more critical off-line items
are presumably checked continuously by GN&C. The likelihood
of an unknown failed path can be reduced by increasing the
frequency of off-line status checks. Emphasis should be,
however, on those paths which may be used in an up-coming
exercise. It should also be pointed out that with scheduled
checking of off-line items, any status indications to the
crew should indicate when such an item was last checked.
Now that a scheme has been developed which solves
when the off-line items are checked, it is now necessary to
turn to how they can be checked. To do this on a general
basis will require a grouping or classification of kinds of
off-line items. These groups are first divided into whether
the off-line item is powered or not. The next consideration
deals with whether the items inputs/outputs are accessible
in the off-line condition. Finally, the issue of whether the
item can actually be tested off line must be considered.
This latter point concerns itself with whether a practical
input (either simulated or actual) can be provided to the
item and whether the item can actually be exercised in the
off-line state. In effect, concern is with whether on-line
conditions can be duplicated.
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Considering all the above possibilities, all kinds
of off-line checking schemes can be devised. It is, however,
hard to beat actually switching the item on line. This
solves most of the problems which can arise by implementing
actual off-line checking and does not conflict with the
scheduled checking scheme previously.developed. Any other
method of checking off-line items should be used only in the
face of compelling reasons.
The next best choice for off-line checking is to
be able to place actual system inputs into the off-line item
and check its performance in the same way the on-line item is
being checked. In this mode of checking, output or effects
of the off-line item cannot be allowed to enter the on-line
operation. This is one of the drawbacks of this scheme since,
sometimes the output "load" must be simulated. The use of
BITE in off-line checking is a potentially powerful technique
and represents one of its best applications. If properly
designed, BITE can be used to verify off-line paths operating
under reduced stress or power. The confidence in such results
is necessarily reduced since the item is seldom being com-
pletely exercised. BITE should be of the most value when
applied to the scheme being addressed here, i.e., applying'
actual on-line information to the off-line item.
The least desirable method of checking off-line
items is to use simulated inputs. This involves the generation
of the inputs and the attendant hardware/software. It should
be pointed out that there will be some equipment aboard
Orbiter which is not used until the final phases of the
mission, e.g., TACAN, MSBLS. For practical purposes, all such
equipment can be considered to be off-line until the deorbit
check. If these equipments are to be actually checked at
this time, a simulator will be required. There is no way of
getting actual inputs to these systems in orbit.
4.3 Sampled Data and Processor Decisions
Consider a subsystem being checked by SM. When in
the powered flight portion of the mission, the parameters will
have a given set of limits used for parameter limit checking.
Once the on-orbit phase is entered, some of these limits will
change or a vehicle reconfiguration will necessitate a differ-
ent parameter processing (such as may result from state changes
to precondition steering). The processor is a sequential
machine. Data are read in sequence and conditions can change
immediately after a parameter was read. The processor will
not be aware of this change until the next data cycle. Thus,
decisions made by the processor are not always correct simply
due to possibly "stale" information. This same principle
applies to all Orbiter processors and the decisions which
are made or commands issued. The GN&C voting schemes will
necessarily be affected by this behavior.
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It should be obvious that these conditions can
trigger false alarms. One scheme for reducing this possi-
bility is to assure all the analog-derived data is sampled
frequently enough to detect changes of interest (whether this
frequency meets the Nyquist criterion depends on what is to
be done with the data) and then assure that all the relevant,
discrete state or configuration data is read in the same cycle.
Then, construct a system which is at least one data cycle
error tolerant. This is the technique currently employed by
SM. The key to the success of this approach is not necessarily
the frequency at which the data are read, but rather that all
necessary discretes are read in the same cycle as the analog
samples. Ignore other factors which motivate high sample
rates for the moment. A parameter could be sampled once an
hour and, so long as the pertinent configuration data for
that parameter were read within the configuration change re-
sponse time of the data reading, the above principle would
not be violated. For example, hydraulic pressure could be
read twice an hour. So long as the configuration of the
hydraulic system was checked within one millisecond of the
pressure reading, there would be very little room for the
stale data effect. This is obviously an exaggeration since
a lot can happen to the hydraulics in half an hour. The
point is that, notification delay, smoothing delay, subsystem
behavior, etc. all dictate rapid data sampling for SM. False
alarms due to configuration inconsistencies do not. They
simply tie configuration sampling to analog-derived data
sampling.
It should be noted that this is not the case with
GN&C. This software is performaing operations and issuing
commands based on a wide variety of analog-derived data inputs.
There are methods which reduce the tieing of confi-
guration data to the analog-derived data. The motive for
their pursuit is the reduction of I/O traffic by reading
configuration data less frequently. The Orbiter configuration
does not change rapidly nor do the operating modes of the
subsystems. From this standpoint it seems fruitless to
sample the state of a subsystem twice a second when it only
changes state ten times in a seven day mission. And, when
it does change state, it requires 120 milliseconds to do so.
Two alternative methods of reducing the data-configuration
tie will be discussed. They are not necessarily being
recommended for general application in SM since each involves
a more sophisticated decision mechanism. They are presented
for consideration in special applications.
The first method to be considered is an adaptive
configuration verification technique. It operates as follows.
Consider that a decision to alarm is imminent for a particular
parameter.based on a 15-minute old configuration check (say
that configuration is checked every 15 minutes). Before the
alarm is issued, the decision mechanism immediately reads
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(on demand) the most recent configuration. If this result
agrees with its initial configuration information, the
alarm is issued. Otherwise, the alarm is inhibited and the
process will begin anew using the updated configuration
information.
The second method deals with data autocorrelation
or self-correlation. This method will not automatically
verify the current configuration when an alarm is imminent.
It first tests the reasonableness of the data based on a
short history it has stored. If the data made a sudden
jump which was considered unlikely for the parameter in
question, the configuration data would be verified. If the
data were erratic, the configuration would be verified. If
the data were reasonable or within the limits of what could
be expected, configuration would not be verified and the
alarm would be issued. The method has very limited appli-
cations to analog data as it is seldom that "reasonable"
behavior can be defined for a failing parameter. Discrete
parameters, however, are another issue. They should be in
one state or the other and should not alternate rapidly be-
tween states. As an example, consider a discrete indication
which is derived from a device which is close to a source
of vibration. The discrete data stream could be a series of
random l's and O's. This is obviously not a normal condition
and a brief data autocorrelation would detect it.
4.4 SM Restarts and Initialization
An analysis of SM would not be complete without a
brief discussion of initialization. The issue which first
arises in these discussions is the starting point of the
initialization, or, in gross terms, whether that initializa-
tion should be cold or hot. The former implies starting at
the beginning, the bootstrap loader. The latter implies a
starting at the top structure by checkpoints or equivalent
devices. It is in effect a "flywheel" concept that allows
the processor to pick up approximately where it left off.
Which of these techniques can be used depends on how "badly"
the processor failed. At issue here is whether to design
for a hot restart capability or not. Such a design imposes
additional work on the processor as well as I/O to Mass
Memory.
There appears to be little justification for a hot
start SM capability, regardless of how it is implemented. If
SM needs to be restarted, it is not a serious problem to lose
all current data and start at the bottom. The following
reasons are cited in support of this statement:
* SM is continuously updated. In one major data
acquisition cycle it will receive a complete
set of information. Within the response time
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of its smoothers it will be about as current as
it will ever get. What is lost is data on the
maintenance recorder and SM downlist data. The
former can be covered by manual recorder con-
trol and the latter is not a serious loss.
* SM does not have to maintain historical records
or operate on long sequences of transactions
where each result depends upon all transaction
which preceded it.
* The DPS Mass Memory is inherently slow. This
reduces the feasibility of checkpointing.
What should be of concern is the speed and ease of
the restart process. First, the crew must have the capability
to restart and they cannot be expected to be computer opera-
tors. The process should be automatic and hault only when a
check condition is not met, e.g., DACBU not powered up. The
crew should be notified of the conditions over which they
have control, such as the preceding example, and the process
should terminate for other reasons. Restart should be dis-
tinguished from initialization since the former is a crew
task and the latter is an LPS task (or at least performed
prior to checkout). The two have different problems and are
initiated under different circumstances.
4.5 Ground Support Trades
The purpose of this section is to examine the trade-
offs between real-time, onboard SM computation and ground-
based, near-real-time SM computation with up- and down-links.
The approach is that of determining the characteristics of
space/earth communication in the 1980 time frame. These
characteristics are then formed into a description of ground-
based computation service and trade-off criteria identified.
Finally, SM functions which are plausible candidates for
the type of ground-based service are identified.
It is assumed that SGLS services will be limited
to mission and payload information exchange and will not be
used for the type of ground-based computational augmentation
considered here. Thus, SGLS capabilities have not been
factored into the analysis.
Space/ground communications services are presented
in Section 4.5.1. Under the limiting assumption above, these
turn out to be characteristics of the STDN. Section 4.5.2
contains a summary of the ground-based services offered as
well as characteristics of services which may be required by
SM. Section 4.5.3 identifies the trade-off criteria.
Finally, Section 4.5.4 identifies SM functions which are
candidates for ground-based service.
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4.5.1 STDN In The 80's
STDN will consist of two subnets: the TDRSS sub-
net and the ground subnet. Current planning by the Goddard
Space Flight Center includes Goldstone, Madrid, Orroral,
Alaska, Merritt Island, and Rosman in the ground subnet with
Bermuda and Tananarive providing only launch support. The
ground subnet is intended to support users whose orbital
geometry is not compatible with TDRS constraints, e.g.,
users whose orbital altitude is in excess of 12,000 kilo-
meters, deep space, earth synchronous. Figures 4.5.1-1
through 4.5.1-4 show the coverage, for indicated user alti-
tudes, for both TDRSS and the ground sites. Ground site
coverage is included within the dashed ellipses. The cross-
hatched area indicates the zone of exclusion for TDRSS. The
zone of exclusion is the only area which TDRSS cannot cover.
Figure 4.5.1-5 shows the percentage of TDRSS coverage for
an average orbit as a function of user altitude. This
relationship is plotted for various orbital inclinations.
International requirements limiting flux density impinging
on earth from a satellite (and presumably the Orbiter as
well) can reduce the TDRSS coverage below that shown in the
illustrations. Such reduction could amount to 20 percent
for users with low earth orbits and omni antennae.
The TDRSS and ground subnets will present compati-
ble interfaces to users. Thus, whether data is transmitted
to TDRS or the ground is essentially transparent to the user.
The ground stations will have the same signaling, acquisition,
receivers, demodulation, decoding, and commanding as TDRSS.
Some additional characteristics of the two subnets
are discussed in the subsections which follow.
4.5.1.1 The TDRSS Subnet
The description presented herein is based on the
"TDRSS Users' Guide" published by GSFC, X-805-74-176, dated
June 10, 1974. Projected NASCOM capabilities were obtained
from a previous release of this document.
Operation with TDRSS will require acquisition of
the first TDRS followed by a handover from the first to
second TDRS when the user's orbit moves between the two TDRS's
primary coverage bands. The user will, unless of sufficient
altitude to preclude occultation, then move into the zone
of exclusion and be reacquired upon emergence by the first
TDRS. Depending on orbital geometry, this cycle could occur
once per orbit or once per day for sun synchronous missions.
TDRSS is designed to offer real-time service for
both telemetry and commands to user Operations Centers.
Figure 4.5.1.1 shows a proposed approach which links the
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Figure 4.5.1.1. TDRSS/NASCOM Ground Communication Plan**
TDRSS earth station at White Sands, New Mexico to GSFC
NASCOM switching facilities and to JSC over high speed
NASCOM lines.*
TDRSS will offer two basic types of service:
single-access service and multiple-access service. The
capabilities and limitations of each are summarized below.
Multiple-Access - serves up to 20 low
data rate users simultaneously for
telemetry and time shares up to 20
users for commands. All links must
be digital. All users are on the
same frequency with separation being.
achieved by code division multi-
plexing.
Command Link
Bandwidth - 5MHz
Duty Factor - Continuous
Command Rate - 100 to 1000 bps
Modulation - PN spread spectrum
PSK biphase.
Telemetry Link
Bandwidth - 5MHz
Max TLM Rate - 48 kbps.
Support Duration
Per User - Continuous when not
in exclusion zone
Modulation - PRN spread spectrum,
PSK biphase
Single-Access - there are two single-access
systems on TDRS, each normally supporting
a single user for both command and tele-
metry. Each system can, independent of
the other, operate at S- or Ku-Band or
both. Each system can, however, simul-
taneously support two users, one at S-
Band and the other Ku-Band, provided they
are both within the beamwidth of the
steerable antenna.
*DOMSAT has also been considered as a means of accomplishing
these links.
ORIGINAL PAGE IS 4-12
OF POOR QUALTY,
S-Band Command Link
User Separation - Each user at a
separate frequency
Bandwidth - 20MHz, tunable over
100MHz
Duty Factor - 100%, normal xmit
power
50%, high xmit
power (shuttle)
Modulation - PN spread spectrum
PSK biphase
S-Band Telemetry Link
User Separation - Each user at
separate frequency
Bandwidth - 10MHz
Max TLM Rate - 5 mbps
Modulation - PSK biphase nominal.
Other modulation
schemes acceptable.
Ku-Band Command Link
Bandwidth - 50MHz
Duty Factor - 100%, normal xmit
power
25%, high xmit power
Modulation - PN spread spectrum,
PSK biphase
Ku-Band Telemetry Link
Bandwidth
Narrow Band Mode - 88 MHz
Wide Band Mode - 225MHz
Max TLM Rate
Narrow Band Mode - 50 mbps. biphase
Wide Band Mode - 150 mbps. biphase
300 mbps. quadri-
phase
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Modulation - PSK biphase nominal.
Other modulation
schemes acceptable.
4.5.1.2 The Ground Subnet
The description presented herein is based on the
"STDN Technical Manual, Digital Data Processing System,"
MM-4287, published by GSFC. This document basically de-
scribes the 1976 capabilities of STDN. Compatibility with
TDRSS has then not been considered but will be necessary by
1979. The overall impact of these compatibility requirements
can only be speculated.
Ground stations making up the ground subnet were
identified in Section 4.5.1. They are:
Goldstone, California
Madrid, Spain
Orroral, Australia
Alaska
Merritt Island, Florida
Rosman, North Carolina
Each site provides telemetry, command and tracking services.
Since the sites will present the same interface to the user
as TDRSS, the signaling and modulation characteristics
identified in Section 4.5.1.1 will also apply to the ground
sites. As indicated in Section 4.5.1, the ground sites do
not complement low altitude satellite support; they are in-
tended to support high altitude (greater than 12,000 Km) users
or users with highly elliptical orbits.
The ground sites will normally store all non-real-
time data (dumped from onboard tape recorders) for subsequent
retransmission over NASCOM at NASCOM data rates. Real-time
data will be forwarded immediately following processing
provided the NASCOM data rates are not exceeded. Should a
real-time data stream exceed NASCOM rates, critical param-
eters will be stripped or decommutated from the stream for
real-time transfer. The remaining data will be stored for
NASCOM transmission at the earliest opportunity.
Each site can handle up to four simultaneous PCM
data streams with a short duration peak rate of one megabit
per second total telemetry input rate. The total sustained
input rate, including all overhead added by processing is 576
kbps. This rate represents the maximum recording (storage)
rate.
The maximum real-time throughput rate per data
stream is limited by the NASCOM lines. For most sites, this
is 7.2 kbps including NASCOM blocking overhead. These circuits
have the potential of being upgraded to 56 kbps.
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Real-time commanding capability is being in-
corporated into the sites such that a Project Operations
Control Center can command a satellite in real time. The
real-time command rate is limited again by NASCOM at 7.2
kbps, including NASCOM blocking overhead. These circuits
also have the potential for upgrading to 56 kbps.
4.5.2 Available And Required Services
This section characterizes the communication and
computation services that might be demanded by the Orbiter
SM of ground support. This is the subject of Section 4.5.2.1.
Section 4.5.2.2 then summarizes the type of ground support,
based on Section 4.5.2.1 above, which will be available to
the Orbiter. This support is considered with and without a
TDRSS. Support during launch poses a special set of problems
and has not been considered.
4.5.2.1 Typical Services Required by SM
Section 2.2 identifies SM functions and indicates
their use demand or time characteristics of operation. Some
of these functions will require display generation while
others require the retrieval of large quantities of data from
files. Still others require minor computation and control.
Most require retrieval of Orbiter parameters in real time
which are to be displayed and/or compared against constant
values on file. Some of the functions must be performed on
a continuous or random demand basis while others are scheduled.
While generalizing the SM processes, it may also be
helpful to state what they do not do. Not represented among
SM computational chores are precision arithmetic, string
manipulations, sorting and filing, file manipulation and
maintenance, protracted recursions, closed loop control
operations.
Except for display creation, SM computation can be
characterized as a large number of simple and (almost) iden-
tical, independent operations. What then can be said about
computational services which may be demanded by ground
support? The characteristics are summarized below.
a. All services will have to be initiated by
or through the onboard processor. This
is a natural fallout since the Orbiter,
and in particular SM, is the user demand-
ing and controlling the service. This
approach differs from that used on Apollo
in that computation results are auto-
matically communicated back to the onboard
computer.
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b. To fulfill the purposes of SM, whether
a service is accomplished onboard or
by ground support should be all but
transparent to the crew. The ground
support should offer only minimal
constraints.
c. Some services can demand real-time
turnaround of the ground if
"transparency" is to be achieved.
d. Computer-to-computer simplex communi-
cation will be required as a minimum.
This implies a set of time slots be
allocated in the PCM stream (or equiv-
alent link) for instruction and
identification from the onboard
computer to the ground computer. An
equivalent up-link will also have to
be established over command links.
e. Orbiter data will be passed to the
ground over the PCM link, necessitating
instantaneous stripping or decommutation
of specific portions of these data to
be operated on by the ground computer.
The decommutating could be different
for each task to be performed on the
ground.
f. Constants will, of practicality, be
stored in the ground computer.
g. Any SM tasks executed by ground-based
computers represent special, albeit
non-challenging tasks for that machine.
The challenges will be in the timing
and communications. Once these are
solved, the potential of implementing
SM secondary functions through ground-
based computers poses a very real
possibility.
4.5.2.2 Available Ground Support
Having surveyed the required services potentially
required of SM, this section will summarize the services pro-
jected to be available to provide ground support. Due to
the special nature of SM support and due to storage of all
necessary constants, it will be assumed that:
a. All potential ground-base computational
support will be performed at a single
facility -- probably at JSC.
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b. Based on the descriptions advanced in
Section 4.5.2.1, execution of any or all
SM functions at the central computing
facility will pose no difficulty in
storage, "horsepower;" or exe tion time.
Also, no difficulty should be experienced
in the linkage and discipline involved
with communication between the onboard
computer and the ground-based computer.
It will then only be necessary to examine the capa-
bility of the communication network between the two computers,
viz., the STDN. These capabilities will be considered with
TDRSS and without TDRSS.
STDN Capabilities With TDRSS
This network is dominated by TDRSS with the ground
stations potentially providing an augmentation role for the
general range of Orbiter altitudes. As such, the contri-
bution of the ground subnet will not be considered. The
Orbiter will be an S-Band single access user and, with capa-
bilities presently planned for this service, the telemetry
and command links can readily be handled. The entire PCM
telemetry stream can be routed directly to the ground central
computing facility. The command link (up-link) should be able
to be implemented with comparable facility. Programmable PCM
decommutation can be implemented at the central computing
facility where it is most cost effective. This network is
depicted in Figure 4.5.2.2.
While Orbiter is in line of sight with a TDRSS,
this network is not only feasible but affords a great deal
of processor augmentation capability. Unfortunately, TDRSS
coverage is less than 100 percent for orbital altitude less
than 1200 kilometers (746 statute miles); see Section 4.5.1.1.
Also, even if handover could be reasonably handled, no ground
site "plugs" the coverage gap. This restriction would pre-
clude the use of ground computer augmentation for rapid
response tasks which are performed on a continuous basis or
which occur in a random fashion. In effect, if a task cannot
be scheduled to coincide with TDRSS coverage or if it cannot
tolerate the queue incurred until the coverage gap is passed,
it is not reasonable to plan it for ground support. For ex-
ample, a 92-minute circular orbit at mid-inclination would
experience a communication dead zone of approximately nine
minutes on the average for each revolution. The occurrence
and duration of this dead zone is predictable as soon as an
orbit is known. Thus, it is not unreasonable, considering the
large percentage of coverage, to schedule certain tasks within
the coverage zone. A change of mission phase is a good example
of such a scheduled task.
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Figure 4.5.2.2. Central Computing Facility Communications Network
STDN Capabilities Without TDRSS
It is appropriate to begin this treatment by taking
an exception to the number of sites identified for the ground
subnet in Section 4.5.1.2. If TDRSS does not materialize
by 1980, it is safe to assume the number of sites cannot be
decreased to the six identified. The total number is more
likely to be ten or twelve based on findings included in the GSFC
document, "STDN Network Integration Plan," dated October 1972.
To achieve near-real-time response through ground
sites, the relatively low data rate over NASCOM will dictate
decommutation of the Orbiter PCM stream at each site. Further-
more, this decommutation will have to be programmable to
accommodate the data (and computer instruction channel) of
interest at the time. This restricts, with few exceptions,
such operations to those which can be scheduled.
Once the data has been stripped, it can be sent
over NASCOM to the central computing facility. The up-link
(command link) is, in principal, accomplished straight away
in near-real-time provided the ground computation tasks are
partitioned such that a minimal amount of data need be trans-
mitted to the Orbiter.
An additional scheduling constraint is imposed with
the use of ground sites and this constraint applies to telem-
etry as well as command. In order that ground sites may
connect directly to the central computing facility, they must
be switched in synchronism with the user orbit by the NASCOM
Switching Facility. This is scheduled to coincide with the
period the user is in view of each site.
Communication coverage by the ground sites (even with
a total of twelve) will be sporadic. For the 92-minute circu-
lar orbit considered earlier, a zenith pass of a site will
result in approximately six minutes of communication coverage.
Furthermore, the likelihood of contiguous site coverage is
remote. Depending on the orbit inclination and phasing, only
a single six-minute contact sould result for an entire orbital
period. This "spotty" coverage together with the large amount
of scheduling will considerably constrain the use of ground-
based computer augmentation using only STDN ground sites.
4.5.3 Tradeoff Criteria
Why would the use of ground-based computer services
be considered and what is being sacrificed by their use?
Directly, the reasons or trades for off-loading SM computa-
tion to the ground are:
Reduce mass memory
program storage
data storage
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Reduce core
program storage
data storage
Reduce processing time
If the realized savings either keep the core and/or mass
memory from growing or, in the best of all worlds, allow
them to be reduced in size, the tradeoff criteria can be
translated directly into savings of weight and power. Un-
fortunately, such trades are usually entered into simply to
keep from exceeding a fixed capacity. This will be especially
true for the criterion of processing time. The trade in this
case can be translated into whether the design can allow
implementation of all defined functions or whether some must
be dropped.
Reduction in processing time by delegating certain
task to ground-computation must be treated with caution. Time
can only be saved if:
a. The delegated task is large compared to
time required to execute the additional
interfacing operations.
b. The task is independent of ongoing on-
board computations. Stated another way,
the task can be well defined and initi-
ated with no -- or certainly very few --
intermediate information transfers with
the onboard computer.
c. The task has simple interfaces at initia-
tion and completion. By this is meant
that there are a minimum number of in-
structions and data passed and that these
be direct (as opposed to indirect or
referential) and independent.
d. Other onboard tasks can continue while
the task is being executed on the ground,
i.e., the onboard processor does not,
routinely, have to wait for results. This
implies true parallel processing.
Most restrictions can be summarized in one short phrase:
treat the ground computer as a batch processor.
While it has been alluded to in the above dis-
cussion, the notion that delegating tasks to a ground computer
complicates onboard programming complexity bears explicit
discussion. The fact is that such action, while possibly re-
sulting in a net decrease in execution time or storage
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requirements, will likely increase SM programming complexity.
This statement is based on two observations; one, programming
of SM for the onboard computer should not be complicated;
two, establishing linkage to a second remote computer may not
be as simple, especially under the Flight Control Operating
System. Thus, the use of a ground computer will likely in-
crease programming cost if the cost of programming the ground
computer is also considered.
The likely increase in programming complexity
leads to the next subject: the other side of the tradeoff
coin. What does it cost to lighten the onboard processing
burden? While each has been discussed previously, it will be
well to identify the criteria which must be traded off
collectively. They are:
* Increase in overall (net) programming cost.
* Reduction in autonomy.
* Additional time constraints on mission
phasing, activity, alteration, and the like.
This is due to lack of 100 percent commu-
nication coverage.
* Decreased response time.
If the last two items are to assume reasonable bounds, ground
support will have to be achieved through TDRSS.* Ground
subnet sites should be considered only for dumping onboard
tapes. Their use for augmented computer support will quite
likely impose a too severe constraint. If TDRSS does not
materialize, augmentation of SM computation on the ground
should not be considered.
It must be noted that the tradeoff criteria apply
only to those SM functions which can feasibly be implemented
on the ground. With lack of 100 percent communication
coverage, functions which are executed on a random basis or
which operate continuously cannot normally be deferred to
ground. Thus, functions which are, or lend themselves to
being, scheduled should.be the only ones considered for
tradeoff.
*The Orbiter S-Band quad antenna system can impose an ad-
ditional scheduling constraint if the ground subnet is used
during Air Force missions. Some attitudes of Orbiter will
force a selection between SGLS and NASA operation for an
optimum earth-directed signal. Manual antenna switching may
be required to overcome this difficulty. This same constraint
also applies to TDRSS operation but to a much lesser extent.
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4.5.4 Candidates For Ground Support
This section identifies the SM functions which
could be implemented in a ground computer. If a function is
scheduled (or able to be scheduled) and can be treated as a
batch process job which can run without holding up other SM
functions, it is a candidate for ground support. This de-
cision is based on results of Section 2.2 which are summarized
in Table 2.2.6. It must be understood that no value judgment
is being placed on ground implementation of these functions
or for that matter, are they to be considered as design
recommendations. The only claim made of identified functions
is that their ground implementation is feasible. The
functions are summarized in Table 4.5.4 and each is discussed
below.
Three functions of the Baseline Design can be im-
mediately eliminated as ground support candidates due to their
involvement with random events, i.e., faults. These are
Fault Detection and Annunciation (FDA), Subsystem Measurement
Management (SMM) and Recorder Control. Note that, due to a
division of information, SMM can be ground-implemented for
the alternative design. The function of Payload Support can
be divided into those tasks which must be executed in real
time and those which can be executed deferred time. The
former tasks must be assigned to the onboard processor while
the latter are ground support candidates. Uplink Service
and Downlist Control constitute real time tasks and are also
eliminated from ground support consideration.
The function of support to ground checkout does not
logically represent a tradeoff candidate. It is, by definition,
to be performed by the onboard processor(s). The extent of
this function will be decided based on tradeoffs with the
KSC Launch Processing System.
Portions of the Subsystems Measurement Management
(SMM) function in the alternative design are well suited for
implementation on the ground. Since all measurements are
being sent to the ground, engineering unit conversion can be
implemented for those variables identified by the display
page number at keyboard request. The converted variables can
then be preformatted into a ground-stored display format or
"skeleton" and transmitted to the orbiter for delivery to
the Display Electronics Unit (DEU). Measurements not
checked by C&W or FPFD could undergo more extensive checking
by a ground processor and results of the tolerance check
placed in the format before transmission to Orbiter.
Since the Configuration Monitoring function is
being performed at fixed points in the mission and since the
Orbiter configuration is being compared against a pre-
determined configuration, this entire function can be imple-
mented on the ground. At keyboard initiation, instructions
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Table 4.5.4. Ground Support Candidate Functions
FUNCTION SUBFUNCTION
1. Engineering Units Conversion.
2. Tolerance checking for all
Subsystem measurements not operated on
Measurement by FDA.
Management2  3. Preformatting of variables
(Alternative
Design Only) for display.
4. Fixed annotation for display
pages ground-stored.
Non-real-time functions whose demand
Payload Support
is manually initiated.
Entire function can be ground-
Configuration
implemented.
Management
Correct configurations stored in
ground processor.
Consumables Non-real-time portion can be ground-
Management implemented.
Telemetry Automatic portion of this function
Format
Selection can be ground-implemented.
-Subfunctions not specifically identified are not
ground support candidates. The reader is referred to
Section 2.2 for a complete list of subfunctions.
-Due to variable telemetry formats, ground-implementation
of this function may restrict the data which can be displayed
at any one time. Furthermore, crew-specified comparison
displays will complicate ground implementation.
would be sent to ground to execute this function for the
indicated mission phase. The ground processor would then
examine all-configuration data and generate an exception
display for transmission to Orbiter.
Consumables Management consists of a near-real-
time pvt calculation segment and several displays, each
showing actual consumable use history nominal consumption and
an abort limit for that consumable. The presentation consists
of time traces of each of these values with the latter two
being fixed during preflight for the nominal mission profile.
If the mission profile varies from the nominal, the value of
nominal consumption and abort levels becomes questionable.
The display portion of Consumables Management (CM)
can be implemented on the ground. Storing the constant traces
for nominal consumption and abort level is a natural for the
ground. The onboard-generated trace of actual consumption
can be interleaved in the processor before relaying to the
DEU. This will require pressure-volume-temperature calcu-
lations for each consumable on board at a fixed interval
and storing the results to generate the consumable use
history. When CM is called by the keyboard, the ground pro-
cessor could generate the indicated display and insert the
constant traces.
Telemetry Format Selection can be executed manually
or automatically based on mission time.and phase. It is a
simple matter to execute the automatic portion in a ground
processor.
In summary, with TDRSS, especially at higher alti-
tudes, implementation of some SM functions in a responsive
ground-based computer is feasible. Autonomy, responsiveness
and some accuracy (due to RF link bit error rate) will be
sacrificed in each case. Net programming cost will. likely
increase. Whether a function can be treated independently
and its ability to be scheduled are the principal criteria
for ground implementation.
4.6 Critical SM Interface Parameters
As its name implies, SM is a management information
system. Its purpose is to assist users in the management of
the Shuttle system. Three users can be identified. They are
the crew, the payload owner and the ground maintenance
operation. Since the crew is the only user with access to
SM, it will be assumed that the payload owner's interests
are served by the crew, in particular, the Payload Specialist.
SM serves ground maintenance by causing Orbiter parameter
and configuration data to be recorded at the time of an
anomaly. The only control SM has over the contents of these
records is what SM itself places there. Thus, the support
to ground maintenance is an indirect one and will not be
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pursued further. All that can reasonably be said of SM
support here is that the operational state of functional
paths, as determined by SM, should be of interest to ground
maintenance and recorded.
It has now been established that the SM user is the
crew and that SM exists to aid the crew in the management of
the Orbiter/payload. If this is its purpose, then the only
interface with any significance is the SM/crew interface.
All other interfaces result from requirements at this inter-
face. This includes the data processing interfaces with
GN&C, Mass Storage, DEU and DACBU. Putting this in the form
of a design guideline, "think crew, not instrumentation."
The physical crew interface is a keyboard and a
CRT. This, however, represents only a vehicle for the inter-
face of interest - the information content and form presented
to the crew as well as that required to converse with SM via
the keyboard. Parameters of such interfaces are difficult
to define and fall directly in the lap of Human Factors
Engineering. Some further characterizations of this inter-
face will be advanced but a detailed definition must remain
part of the system analysis. Suffice it to say that the
critical interface has been identified and its definition,
along with the implied definition of other interfaces, will
be part of the system analysis task.
One objective of SM is to reduce the implied crew
workload of managing the Orbiter/Payload. This objective is
obviously met by automating what would otherwise be manually
accomplished tasks. Another objective is Orbiter autonomy.
Virtually all the tasks accomplished by SM have been histori-
cally accomplished (in one sense or another) on the ground
by large computing facilities and an equally large contingency
of personnel. Increased autonomy, then, is a two-edged sword,
for it also implies a dramatic reduction in operating costs.
It is worthy to note that the implication of SM "replacing"
ground operations imposes an ambitious task on SM and an
equally impressive requirement on the crew interface. To
fulfill this objective, SM will have to do a good deal of
data processing, sorting and assimilation. Information pre-
sented to the crew will have to be well organized and
structured such that it is unambiguous, sufficient and not
overwhelming.
A third objective of SM which has not been stated
in the literature but which is strongly implied by the pre-
ceding is crew responsiveness. By responsiveness is meant
the crew's ability to take timely corrective action or make
contingency decisions necessitated by unscheduled or emer-
gency conditions. If a mission went completely according
to plan, SM would contribute to nothing more than a reduction
of crew workload, which incidentally, was mostly imposed by
autonomy. This is far from trivial, but SM's true value
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becomes apparent during an emergency situation. It is the
crew's link to the information needed by them to minimize
their risk. SM contributes the most when the crew is the
busiest.
4.7 The SM Model Dilemma
One of the objectives of this study was to construct
an analytical model or simulation of SM capable of predicting
change impacts and evaluating the effectiveness of fault
detection techniques. Attempts to achieve such a model were
unsuccessful. This statement demands some explanation, not
only because this was an objective but more importantly to
prevent this ground from being retraced. This is the sub-
ject of the following material.
It is important to begin by indicating the proper-
ties of a model or simulation for use in evaluating system
design changes. First, it must be easy to use. Second, it
must be sensitive to the causes which effect changes in the
performance measures. It should, at the same time, be in-
sensitive to the detail of how a function is implemented.
Finally, it should operate on quantifiable variables and
yield quantified results which are easy to interpret. It
should indicate not only whether a change affected the design
adversely or not, but also how much.
The performance measures of just an automated per-
formance monitor such as exists, albeit widely distributed,
in GN&C are conceptually straightforward since a known re-
sponse will occur when a fault is detected, i.e., a path will
be switched out. Performance for such a device is judged by
probability of false alarm and the probability of a miss.
The cost of each of these errors could also be included to
provide proper weighting of the errors. Even here, however,
a system level model poses problems. First, the two cited
probabilities are very sensitive to implementation and the
model, at least at this stage, should be reasonably in-
sensitive to implementation. Second, the relationships be-
tween the probabilities and the performance monitor inputs,
e.g., data identity, sample rate, information content, points
of verification, are not as yet mathematically tractable,
let alone quantifiable. It is easier to model a specific
implementation than to take one step backward in generality
to achieve a system model. And, it is not clear what value
a model of a specific implementation would have.
SM is more than a performance monitor, it is a crew
management information system. There is little utility in
retracing the steps of the previous modeling description. Be-
sides, while false alarms are of concern, there is no way
of attaching a significance to their occurrence since a
forced response does not result. The crew can choose to
simply ignore the alarm. Misses have a similar problem.
4-24
Except for C&W, the response time of SM is not critical and
it will eventually annunciate a hard failed condition.
These two parameters would evaluate only a portion of SM
anyway. In short, a model describing just performance
monitoring is not only inadequate for SM, it is also mis-
leading.
The measures of performance for a system should
provide an indication of how well it is achieving its ob-
jectives. These objectives were stated in Section 4.6 and a
are: reduced crew workload, increased autonomy and increased
crew responsiveness (which could also be construed as a
safety measure). How are these measures quantified? A
satisfactory answer was not found. Nor, for that matter,
was a satisfactory set of alternative measures which could
be quantified ever found. Section 4.6 indicates that the
output of SM is basically a Human Factors problem. The
Human Factors approach to such a problem is to set up ex-
periments using the designs to be evaluated and have subjects
(in this case the crew) actually use the alternative designs.
Subject fatique, error rate and the like are then measured
and factored with their individual assessment of the designs.
The models in this case are physical and quite specific.
Analytical models are found in the Human Factors laboratory.
It is, however, one thing to construct an analytical model
for a laboratory but quite another to construct a system
engineering model to evaluate system impacts from changes.
Some cause and effect relationships were dis-
covered which are used,in the system analysis in Sections 2.0
and 3.0. With these it is possible to determine the proper
direction to take and assess whether a change has increased
or decreased autonomy, crew workload or responsiveness. The
next logical question that should be asked is, how much was
the effect? This implies both quantization of the perform-
ance measures as well as a complete "audit trail" from
cause to effect. This could not be done. If the sample
rate of hydraulic pressure is reduced by 50%, how much does
this affect reduction in crew workload?
This section should end on a positive note, indi-
cating what has been learned. First, systems such as SM
have not yet reached a stage formal enough to warrant ana-
lytical modeling. The subjective approach, guided by an
appropriate checklist for the design, is the state-of-the-
art. Second, a strong set of performance measures has been
defined. These help considerably in reducing subjectivity
and the scope or latitude of design evaluations. Finally,
some cause-effect relationships have been.defined. These
are discussed in the following section.
4.8 A Design Checklist
Efforts at modeling SM resulted in the establish-
ment of a design checklist. This checklist was used in the
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system assessment in Section 2.0 and should be of aid in
tracking and evaluating SM design changes. Each perform-
ance measure will be broken down into its constituent
contributions to formulate the checklist. As may be.ex-
pected, many of the factors are repeated for the performance
measures.
The objective of autonomy is to significantly
reduce the ground operations contingency. The extent that
the crew, using SM, can accomplish this is a measure of
autonomy. What factors contribute to this measure? Basic-
ally,. the crew will need essentially the same information
ground operations used to get. Furthermore, this information
will have to be more compact and easier to interpret since
the Orbiter will not be carrying along the team of experts
that existed on the ground. The design parameters which
directly affect this are:
* Sufficient information. Is enough in-
formation available?
o Information Accessibility. Can the
information be retrieved by the crew?
* Information Organization. Is the in-
formation organized such that the
decisions made by ground operations
can be duplicated? Can a convenient
assessment be made of current vehicle/
payload status?
* Credibility. Are the results consistently
believable?
Autonomy and reduction of crew workload are far
from independent. They are in fact, dependent. If it were
not necessary for Orbiter to be autonomus, the crew would
have much less to do. Thus, in order for SM to increase
autonomy while not increasing crew workload, it will neces-
sarily have to do more tasks, become more automatic and have
more clear cut data presentation techniques. A large portion
of SM tasks could be performed manually. For a given level
of autonomy, this is a pretty good indicator of how much SM
is reducing crew workload.
The design factors which directly affect crew
workload are:
o Functional Usability. Is SM easy to access
and control? Will the task of updating,
monitoring and controlling SM be almost as
great as that of manually performing the
Orbiter assessment? Can the necessary
information be directly obtained?
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* Information Presentation. Is the information
easily and quickly interpreted? Is it concise?
Is there too much at one time? Is a lot of
manual analysis required for routine infor-
mation? Must corroborative checking be
routinely relied upon?
* Information Levels & Criticality. Is the
information divided into segments which group
those conditions which require immediate
attention, deferred attention and interest-
only attention? Does the information re-
sponse time correlate with these criticality
levels?
* Information Accuracy. Is the information
accurate enough for the purpose? Is it
sampled sufficiently? Is it sufficiently
correlated with vehicle configuration? Does
information accuracy correspond with whether
a gross assessment is being performed or a
detailed evaluation?
Crew responsiveness is concerned with the degree
with which SM aids the crew in an emergency. The design
parameters which directly affect responsiveness include
those in reduction of workload plus the following:
* Credibility. In emergency situations, SM
results must be believable. There may not
be time to trace all the information. Have
false alarms been decreased to a practical
level? Can unavoidable false alarms be
conveniently handled? Does SM have a
viable self-checking feature?
o Troubleshooting Ability. Can the crew quickly
get to the cause of a problem? Can they assess
its extent conveniently. Can they easily
associate parameter readings with physical/
functional locations on the vehicle? Can they
correlate data easily? Can they reliably
determine not only if a parameter is in
bounds or not but how it is behaving?
It can be seen from the above that performance
monitoring is only part of the SM problem. Performance
monitoring per se is embodied in only two SM functions.
FDA and SMM. Requirements on how performance monitoring
results are to be handled cannot be established until the
crew is considered. The design factors for performance
monitoring are extensively covered in Volume II to this
report.
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The distinction between performance monitoring and
other SM functions is important. Performance monitoring de-
termines the operational integrity of vehicle subsystems.
It should be able to also determine if the subsystem func-
tional paths are operating acceptably or not. In addition, it
should provide the capability to verify the functional path
determinations as well as the capability to assess the extent
of a problem. All other SM functions cannot be considered
as performance monitoring. Vehicle configuration, remaining
consumables and C&W constitute operational information, not
performance information. An exhausted consumable does not
represent degraded subsystem performance. Although associ-
ated subsystems will soon cease to function, they are not
necessarily to blame for the condition. This is operations
information.
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5.0 TOPICS FOR FURTHER STUDY
One of the important functions of a study is not
only to accomplish the immediate objectives but to identify
areas requiring additional investigation. These areas are
identified below.
a. The purpose of SM Maintenance Recorder
control is to provide a data window
spanning the time a fault occurred.
Depending on the behavior of the
parameter at the time of Fault, using
the results of Fault Annunciation
could seriously shift this window due
to False Alarm Avoidance. Using out-
limit conditions prior to False Alarm
Avoidance could cause an excess of
data. Whether either of these is a
problem depends on what data ground
maintenance needs. The recorder con-
trol mechanism should be examined
further.
b. This area directly relates to (a) above.
Requirements for ground maintenance data
should be established. This involves
a development of a more detailed ground
maintenance concept and a complete
testing/isolation philosophy. In addition,
requirements for a software data processor
for analyzing Maintenance Recorder data
should be established.
c. How SM operation is to be verified by LPS
is bound to affect its design. This area
should be resolved and design requirements
placed on SM.
d. When subsystem functional paths change
operating modes or are turned ON/OFF,
transients are sure to result. It is not
clear if False Alarm Avoidance will handle
these situations. Several solutions have
been advanced by the Baseline designer.
Evaluation of these solutions is not clear
cut. Transient-handling sould be examined
in more detail.
e. The function of false alarm avoidance is
used extensively in SM. Furthermore, it
serves in a rather critical SM role. Two
methods of false alarm avoidance are de-
scribed in this report and each has been
analyzed regarding pros and cons as well as
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gross performance. In view of their
role, the two techniques, including higher
order versions, should be more carefully
analyzed with simulation.
f. The alternative design presented in this
report requires data analyses which are
not currently required by SM. Specifically,
these are (a) the functional path defini-
tions, (b) functional path parameter and
performance measure definition and (c),
status resolution or post-condition steering
definition. These analyses will be required
to the extent that the alternative design
is adopted and can be performed as described
in Volume II to this report.
g. To the extent that the alternative design
is adopted, additional implementation design
and software functional specification will
be required.
5-2
APPENDIX A
SOME ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
Al INTRODUCTION
This appendix contains several SM design options
which occurred during the course of the system analysis and
which, for various reasons, were not included in the alter-
native design. Their direct application is not necessarily
recommended since the implications of their inclusion were
not completely pursued. The options are believed to have
potential; if not in described methods, then at least in the
principles they represent. It is likely that some of the
options have been brought up during early SM development and
were forced out by design trades. Since the alternative
design alters many of the suppositions which were likely
used in the Baseline Design, the options should be considered
in this new light.
SCHEDULED FUNCTIONAL PATH STATUSEVALUATIONS
The basis for this option is discussed in Section
4.1. Its implementation will further reduce false alarms.
Every functional path does not justify continuous status
determination. This is particularly true for off-line paths.
The functional paths should be divided into two logical
groups: one requiring continuous status determination and
the other, scheduled determination. The groups should be
identified logically since the physical equipment can not be
assigned to one group or the other. It will move between
groups depending on whether it is on-line or off-line, whether
it is operative or inoperative and on the mission phase.
The group containing continuous verification items
is checked as always. The group requiring scheduled deter-
mination will be status checked on demand from the crew. In
view of the correlation between crew requirement for this
information and vehicle configuration checks, demand or
scheduled status checking could be incorporated as part of
SCM. Additional displays should not be necessary.
CONSTANT VALUE SELF-CHECK
One of the difficulties with verifying the operation
of any function, especially the hardware/software combination
of a digital computer, is the inability to evaluate the
operations when they are handling unknown data. A way around
this is to insert a known constant into the input data stream
and check how the processors handle this constant. Since
the input quantity is constant, the process should always
handle it the same and produce the same result. For SM, this
could be a known constant voltage analog applied at an OI
MDM which was read just as any other parameter. The known
parameter would be processed and limit checked. If this
parameter ever checked out-of-limits, SM hardware (CPV/IOP)
or software is very likely to be malfunctioning. Since the
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decision processes within SM are serial operations, this
parameter passes through the same operations as all other
parameters, and, under very similar circumstances. A
smoothed indication of this parameter being defective could
be switched to a hardwire computer output.
The preceding represents one approach to a constant
value self-check. There are numerous variations on the theme.
Depending on the extent of checking desired and any resulting
ambiguities which must be resolved, the knownvalue could be
inserted virtually anywhere, e.g., a PROM in the IOP, and
checked at several places along the data route. In the above
description, the known value was inserted before the DACBU.
A DACBU verification of this value would be a viable BITE
operation of the DACBU/OI bus.
MANUAL SM TEST FOR NO ALARMS
This option is an extension of the self-test de-
scribed above. SM design has been dominated by ways and
means to avoid false alarms. This concern has not been un-
warranted but there is a complementary issue which should also
receive attention - especially if all the efforts to reduce
false alarms prove entirely successful. SM is an exception
reporting device. Everything is assumed well by default. If
all is well, SM does nothing. An entire shift could go by
without a peep from SM. It would be natural to inquire if
it is still working as such a failure mode could be possible.
How does the crew verify this?
A way is to force an out-of-limits parameter and
see if SM catches it. This could be done using the constant
value discussed earlier. A panel switch or pushbutton could
change this value (or some other known value) to a constant
out-limit condition. SM should then respond to this condition.
The scheme is a rather comprehensive checker since it follows
the same information flow as the constant value check. In
effect, the constant value check verifies that SM remains
quiet when it should and this check verifies that SM responds
when it should. If the known parameter were given a large
smoothing constant, the panel button could also verify
operation of the smoothing process. An extended depression
of the button would guarantee a response if SM was working.
A momentary depression should result in no response. As
before, there are numerous variations on the theme.
CONFIGURATION MONITORING CONSUMABLES DISPLAY
It is not difficult to incorporate a consumables
check as part of Configuration Monitoring. Such a check
would give a GO/NO-GO to minimum acceptable consumables levels
for the up-coming mission phase. If a NO-GO occurs for some
consumable, it is not currently convenient for the crew to
determine just how serious the condition is. The existing
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nominal consumption display appears to be too coarse for
this determination and the alternative method is to manually
check hard copy. A consumables scan display incorporating
bar plots of remaining consumables as well as a minimum
acceptable level would not only indicate GO/NO-GO but the
extent of the condition. Such a display appears on the
cover of this report.
DATA PROCESSING STATUS PRESERVATION
One of the most important maintenance aids for data
processing equipment is the contents of its registers at the
time of the failure. In particular these registers include
ADDRESS, STATUS, PSW and PC. The contents of these registers
will aid ground maintenance and turn-around and a concerted
effort should be made to get this information on the
Maintenance Recorder.
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APPENDIX B
BASELINE DEFINITION
SYSTEM MANAGEMENT (SM)
OPERATIONAL VERSION
Bl.0 INTRODUCTION
This Appendix provides the conceptual level of the
SM baseline design definition. The definition is, for the
most part, based on Johnson Space Center Document Number SS-
P-0002-430, Space Shuttle Program Orbiter Project, Computer
Program Development Specification, Vol. IV, Book 3, dated
July 5, 1974. While this document is intended to specify the
Approach and Landing Test (ALT) version of System Management,
there is a more-than-adequate framework upon which to build
an operational version. Other documentation predating the
above reference (for example, see Section 2.3 in the body of
the report) was used as reference to complete the structure.
It has been tacitly assumed that the portions of the design
applicable to ALT will remain essentially unchanged for the
operational version.
Section B2.0 provides an overview of the SM function
while Sections B3.0 through B5.0 provide SM inputs, SM pro-
cesses and SM outputs, respectively. Finally, Section B6.0
discusses the crew interface and operations in more detail.
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B2.0 PERFORMANCE OVERVIEW
System Management (SM) is basically an operations
and maintenance information system and is implemented ex-
clusively in software. It has access to all the Data Process-
ing System peripherals (keyboards, CRT's, Display Electronics
Units and Mass Memories) as well as the PCM Master (DACBU).
SM provides the crew information regarding the
vehicle health, configuration and performance as well as status
of consumables. The automatic selection of telemetry format
is also accomplished by SM as determined by mission phase.
SM contributes to Orbiter maintenance and turn-
around by controlling the onboard maintenance recorder and in-
serting portions of its processing results into the telemetry/
recorder data stream.
SM contributes to payloads or Oribiter users by pro-
viding the same services it does for the crew. SM also provides
the capability to generate and transmit onboard commands/data
to payloads.
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B3.0 SM INPUTS
This section identifies SM input entities and the
information moving from these entities. Three entities are
defined: crew, Orbiter systems and uplink.
B3.1 Crew Inputs
The crew communicates with SM using the keyboards.
No CRT-related communication (cursor, etc.) is available.
The following types and operations enter this input.
* Payload data/commands
* SM display selection
* SM initialization control
" SM process control
- change limit values
- override parameter values
- change smoothing constants
- inhibit alarm for selected parameter
- change program constants
- inhibit alarm tone
- turn FDA on-off
* SM process control display/function selection
* Manual telemetry format change (load)
B3.2 Orbiter Systems Input
The following information types and sources enter
this input.
* DACBU
- Vehicle Operational Instrumentation (01) data.
These are essentially all data not flight
critical
- Payload data
" GN&C
- Flight data retrieved by GN&C and relayed to SM
- GN&C subsystem status, i.e., results of GN&C
automatic redundancy management
* Support from Data Processing System
B3.3 Uplink Inputs
There are two distinct uplink paths; R.F. and GSE
umbilical.
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B3.3.1 R.F. Uplink
The following are received via the R.F. uplink.
o Parallel switch commands (vehicle)*
o Other SM commands/data
B3.3.2 Umbilical Uplink
This path is used during ground servicing by Ground
Support Equipment (GSE). Information received by this path
has yet to be defined.
*This is not a normal operating mode.
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B4.0 SM PROCESSES
This section describes the processes performed by
SM. The processes identified are those necessary to fulfull
the intended purposes of SM. It is recognized that imple-
mentation will demand further processes such as table manage-
ment, display management and general software "housekeeping."
B4.1 Fault Detection and Annunciation (FDA)
FDA will detect that a parameter value is outside a
defined tolerance, notify the crew that such a condition ex-
sists and provide information about the location of the
problem identified. To accomplish this, FDA has been parti-
tioned into four further processes: Precondition Steering,
Limit Sensing, False Alarm Avoidance and Fault Annunciation.
Each of these is described below. FDA nominally operates in
continuous time.
Operationally, when any parameter is determined to
be out-of-limits, a flag is also set by FDA indicating the
sense of the condition. This flag is used for display. An
alarm is not sounded, however, until this condition exists for
a predetermined number of consecutive samples of the parameter.
These consecutive retrys constitute data smoothing. When the
persistency has been tested, an alarm is sounded. At any given
time, neither are the parameters necessarily limit checked
nor are the limit values necessarily the same as the previous
check. This is due to the various operational modes of the
equipment as well as their changing configuration throughout
the mission. The role of determining proper parameter condi-
tions is that of Precondition Steering.
B4.1.1 Precondition Steering
Precondition Steering is a parallel FDA control
process. It does not process parameters to be limit-checked.
Rather, it controls which parameters are to be checked and
the values of the limits used (based on a predefined, discrete
repertoire). Precondition Steering uses (a) the value of the
vehicle configuration parameters, (b) some selected, associated
parameter values and (c) the status of crew-entered FDA con-
trols (see Section B6.0) to effect this control,based princi-
pally on combinatorial logic.
B4.1.2 Limit Sensing
Based on conditions determined by Precondition
Steering, Limit Sensing will determine for each parameter, in
turn, whether the value of that parameter is within a pre-
specified value. If the parameter is out of limits, this
condition is transmitted to False Alarm Avoidance and a flag
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indicating the sense of the condition is generated. The flag
is made available to Fault Annunciation and Subsystem
Measurement Management (Section B4.2).
B4.1.3 False Alarm Avoidance
This process falls between Limit Sensing and Fault
Annunciation. It effects a smoothing on the out-of-limits
indications determined by Limit Sensing. The intent of the
process is to avoid alarms for transient out-of-limit condi-
tions and to avoid repeated alarms for the same out-of-limit
condition. The smoothing is effected as follows:
a. Transient Avoidance
An out-of-limit condition must exist for "n"
consecutive Limit Sensing tests before a
signal is relayed to Fault Annunciation. If
the run is interrupted at all by an in-limit
condition, the process begins anew at the first
out-of-limit indication.
b. Repeated Alarm Avoidance
Once a parameter out-of-limit signal has been
sent to Fault Annunciation (as determined by the
test in (a) above), this signal cannot again be
sent (for the same parameter) until that param-
eter has transitioned to in-limit and remained
there for "n" consecutive tests. Once this
condition is met, the process in (a) is repeated.
The smoothing parameter "n" indicated above is parameter
peculiar and is contained within the FDA data base. As implied
by the notation, the consecutive counts for transient and re-
peated alarm avoidance are the same.
B4.1.4 Fault Annunciation
FDA is responsible for detecting two classes of
conditions: a Caution and Warning (C&W) class and an alert
class. As the name implies, out-limit conditions existing in
the C&W class are more critical than similar conditions in the
alert class. FDA serves as a software backup to a dedicated
electronic (hardware) C&W system in that class. It is, how-
ever, the only indicator for the alert class of out-limit
conditions.
When an out-limit condition is determined (by False
Alarm Avoidance) for either class, a message is generated for
the Fault Summary Display (see Section B6.0) identifying the
parameter and other pertinent data. In addition, depending on
the class, the following occurs:
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* C&W Class
A decidated FDA, C&W Light is illuminated (This
in turn causes the Master C&W alarm to sound.)
* Alert Class
A decidated FDA Alert Light is illuminated and
an audible tone is generated.
The audible alert alarm de-energizes automatically. The indi-
cators are extinguished by an ACKNOWLEDGE COMMAND initiated by
the crew on the keyboard.
Fault Annunciation increments a cumulative counter
each time a Fault Summary message is generated.
B4.2 Subsystem Measurement Management (SMM)
This process allows the crew to assess vehicle per-
formance and health based on results of Limit Sensing and Fault
Annunciation as well as values of parameters and configuration
indicators which it fetches. The process contains the operations
necessary for the crew to compose an SMM or Parametric Display.
Composition consists of parameter identification, suppression
options, units options, number base options and narrative/
graphics options. Two operations of significance to this pro-
cess are engineering unit conversion and number base conversion.
Each parametric display can be unique (since it is
defined or composed) and two or more such displays can exist
on different CRT's.
B4.3 Subsystem Configuration Monitoring (SCM)
This process allows the crew to verify the vehicle
configuration at predetermined points in the mission. Opera-
tionally, the current vehicle configuration, reflected by
configuration indicators (switch scan among others) and
selected parameter values, are compared against a stored con-
figuration for this particular checkpoint in the mission.
Exceptions to the check are displayed in English language on
the SCM Discrepancy Display. SCM is thus an automated crew
checklist.
Each callup of SCM causes a single comparison pass
to be made. Repeated comparisons (to verify results) are
achieved by repeated callups.
B4.4 Consumables Management (CM)
The purpose of this process is to provide the crew
aid in establishing and evaluating status of consumables and
their relationship to mission continuation. A graphic CRT
display is defined for each type consumable. This display
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plots, as a function of mission elapsed time, nominal con-
sumption, actual consumption and minimum levels for safe
return.
B4.5 Data Recording Management
The purpose of this process is to preserve signifi-
cant data for use by Ground Operations in Orbiter turnaround
maintenance. The data are stored on the Maintenance Recorder
which is dumped over the GSE umbilical on return. Two modes
of control exist. The first mode centers about FDA-detected
faults. When a faulty parameter is detected, the process
causes the most previous two minutes (nominally) of data to
be dumped from the loop recorder to the maintenance recorder
and also causes the maintenance recorder to record the next
two minutes (nominally) of data. This provides a data window
centered about the occurrence of the fault.
The second involves continuous recording during
critical flight periods. During dynamic flight (e.g., boost,
change orbit, reentry) the process commands the maintenance
recorder to run continuously. Transfer of data from the loop
recorder is unnecessary.
The data recorded is determined by the current
format residing in DACBU.
B4.6 Telemetry Format Selection (TFS)
This process selects the 128 kb/s and 64 kb/s for-
mats used by the DACBU for telemetry downlink and onboard data
recording as well as the format used in support of GSE over
the umbilical. A change of telemetry format is accomplished
either automatically by this process or manually through this
function by a crew interface option. In the automatic mode,
the selected format is a programmable function of mission
elapsed time, GMT or mission phase. When the proper time
condition is met, the process automatically initiates a
reload of the DACBU RAM used to store telemetry format.
In the manual mode, the format change is controlled
by the crew using the keyboard and a display designed for this
purpose. The process automatically verifies the data transfer
from mass memory as well as the transfer to DACBU RAM. The
display is used to apprise the crew of the process events and
check results.
B4.7 Payload Support
This process provides the same SM functions provided
the vehicle, i.e., those in Sections B4.1 through B4.5. In
addition, it provides the capability to generate and transmit
onboard commands/data to the payload.
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B4.8 Ground Support
This process exists only during Orbiter umbilical
connection to GSE. It has yet to be defined but generally
works under control of, and in connection with, Ground Support
to:
* Aid in LRU fault isolation
* Provide data acquisition format selection (see
Section B4.6) for GSE
* Control subsystem configuration via command de-
coders
* Provide computational assistance to GSE using
programming unique to this application
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B5.0 SM OUTPUTS
This section identifies SM output entities and the
information moving from SM into these entities. Five entities
are defined: crew, DACBU, Recorders, Payload and Umbilical
Downlink.
B5.1 Crew Outputs
SM communicates to the crew by the CRT and two.panel
indicator. The following information types are related by
CRT.
* All parameter values (payload and vehicle) plus
associated annotation to identify them. Param-
eters are expressed in Engineering Units and
number base is an option in some cases.
* Parameter out-limit, out-scale and questionable
results indications. The former indicate sense
of condition and the latter are based on detected
data transfer errors. The limit indications are
unsmoothed.
* English language expressions of exceptions to a
configuration comparison (from SCM).
* Time history of consumables consumption plus
nominal, predicted consumption and safe return
quantities.
* List of parameters which have been declared faulty
by Fault Annunciation.
* Control indications for manual telemetry format
selection (load).
* Control indications for various SM performance
options and initialization initiated by the crew.
* SM software status which portrays the current con-
dition of the processes and stored program numerical
values (tables, data base, etc.).
Panel Indications to the crew are as follows:
* C&W dedicated illuminated indicator which is
energized by Fault Annunciation.
* Alert dedicated illuminated indicator which is
energized by Fault Annunciation. This indication
is accompanied by an audible alarm.
B-10
B5.2 DACBU Outputs
SM provides three types of information to the DACBU:
telemetry format load, downlist and table dumps.
* Telemetry Format Load
Loads DACBU RAM(s) with new formatting routines
fetched from Mass Memory.
* Downlist
The downlist provided is interstaced into the DACBU
telemetry stream. It constitutes SM's contribution
to that stream. Information contained in the down-
list is as follows:
- Fault summary data
- State of FDA on/off control
- State of SM discrete outputs (indicators, re-
corder control)
- Command verification results
- Returned (echoed) commands for ground verifi-
cation
- SCM discrepancies, when SCM active
- Vehicle/mission ID (keyboard entry)
- Selected Data Processing System data, e.g., BITE
results.
* SM Table Dumps
On command, any table in SM can be dumped to DACBU
for inclusion into telemetry stream.
B5.3 Recorder Outputs
SM provides an output to turn on the Maintenance Re-
corder and a separate output to cause the Loop Recorder to dump
onto the Maintenance Recorder.
B5.4 Payload Outputs
SM has the capability to send commands/data to pay-
loads from crew-composed messages.
B5.5 Umbilical Downlink
Information transferred through this entity has yet
to be defined but will generally consist of LRU isolation
data, command verification, BITE results, and selected
parameter values.
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B6.0 CREW INTERFACE AND OPERATIONS
This section outlines crew interface with SM and
indicates the more significant crew responses. From Sections
B3.1 and B5.1 (SM/Crew inputs/outputs), it is obvious that
the vast majority of crew action involves the CRT and keyboard.
Consequently, this section will address crew interaction with
these two mechanisms. The discussion is centered about avail-
able crew displays which have been divided into two categories:
operations displays and SM control displays. The former are
used to present SM operational information to the crew while
the latter are used to assess control and/or modify the SM
processes and stored values, e.g., change smoothing constants.
Each display must be called from the keyboard; no displays are
forced. Data contained in an active display will, however,
be automatically updated.
Each CRT' has a scratch pad line and a message line.
The former is used to display keyboard inputs or composition.
The latter is used to deliver messages to the crew.
To place the SM displays in perspective, GN&C has
its own set of display pages. SM displays, then, form a sub-
set of the entire Orbiter display complement.
B6.1 Operations Displays
These displays represent output of the SM processes
identified in Section B4.0.
B6.1.1 Fault Summary Page
This display is a pushdown list of the most recent
20 faults as determined by False Alarm Avoidance. This dis-
play is called by a dedicated key on the keyboard. For each
fault, the following is identified.
- Parameter out-limit occurrence time.
- Alphanumeric location/description of parameter.
- CRT page number on which the details of the
parameter can be observed using SMM parametric
displays.
- For C&W parameters, parameter value and out-limit
sense indicator.
B6.1.2 Configuration Monitoring Discrepancy Display
During a configuration verification, which is initi-
ated by keyboard and performed by SCM, the crew enters the
appropriate configuration list ID into the keyboard. This list
ID determines the configuration to which the actual configura-
tion is to be compared. Exceptions to the configuration list
are displayed in English language on the Discrepancy Display.
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B6.1.3 Consumables Management Displays
The crew will call up CM via keyboard and then in-
dicate the consumable of interest. CM will then plot actual
use history, nominal usage and safe return values (see Section
B4.4).
B6.1.4 SMM Parametric Displays
This display is driven by subsystem Measurement
Management and the displayed data status indications are those
determined by Limit Sensing, i.e., they are unsmoothed.
The crew will call up SMM via keyboard and then in-
dicate the page number on which the desired set of parameters
is contained. This display will nominally contain the param-
eter name, ID, value, out-limit sense indicator and scale
limit indicators. It is, however, very flexible and each dis-
play is defined by the keyboard.
B6.1.5 Telemetry Format Load Display (Manual)
To change the commutation format of the on-line DACBU,
the crew, by panel switch, causes the DACBU to switch to its
"Hard" format. The crew then calls up this display by keyboard
and then identifies the desired format also by keyboard. The
display then indicates the currently selected format ID as
well as results of the data transfer error checks (see Section
B4.6). On completion, the crew places the on-line DACBU back
to the programmable RAM to resume operation using the new
format.
B6.2 SM Control Displays
There are six of these displays and the total effect
is that of allowing the crew to alter virtually everything in
SM.
B6.2.1 Initialization Display
SM initialization is controlled by the keyboard and
the purpose of this display is to monitor and indicate the
status/progress of initialization. The sequence of initial-
ization is described below and this display presumably plays
an interactive role as manually initiated retry and skip
options are available.
1. Load SM programs
2. Initiate data acquisition and check validity of:
a. Payload MDM BITE
b. DACBU BITE
c. OI MDM BITE
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3. Automatically turn on FDA
B6.2.2 Table Maintenance Display
This display is called by the keyboard using the
parameter ID. While there is but a single page to this
display, a unique display exists for each parameter in the
vehicle as well as those checked on the payload.
This display contains all data peculiar to the
identified parameter. The purpose of the display is to give
the crew the capability to change, for every parameter, limit
values and noise filter (smoothing) constants. The capa-
bility also exists to override the actual value read (from
DACBU) for a parameter by a constant which will be used by all
future SM processing. Also, the crew has the capability to
inhibit annunciation of a parameter.
Changes are made by keyboard entry. The process
consists of first entering the item number of the data item
to be changed. (A change of limit values has a unique item
number, override parameter has another, unique item number,
etc.) The new value/instruction is then keyed in.
B6.2.3 Constant Change Display
The crew has the capability to change any computa-
tional constant used by SM. This display is used to aid in
effecting this change. The display is called by keyboard.
The constant to be changed is then placed on the display by
keying its ID number. The constant value plus its ID are then
displayed. To change the value, the item number of "change
constant" is keyed in followed by the new value.
This display is also used to enter/change the vehicle/
mission identifiers used in the telemetry format.
B6.2.4 FDA Controls Display
The crew has the capability to turn FDA ON or OFF,
inhibit the alert tone for FDA alerts and to change the per-
sistency with which a fault message appears on the Fault
Summary page. This latter control is called interlock time
and is discussed more fully below. It is, in effect, another
smoother cascaded to the existing False Alarm Avoidance.
To aid in these changes, the FDA controls display
is called by the keyboard. This display contains the status
of FDA on/off, alert tone on/off and the value of interlock
time. Changes are once again made by keying in item numbers.
The purpose of the FDA interlock is to prevent
(further) the repetition of a faulty parameter indication
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appearing on the Fault Summary page (when this page is dis-
played). It works as follows: when a faulty parameter
message has been generated by Fault Annunciation, it will not
reappear on the Fault Summary page if it has already been
displayed there within the interlock time.
B6.2.5 Configuration Monitoring Comparison Changes
The crew has the capability to change the state or
limits checked for each parameter in the SCM comparison. This
display is called via keyboard to assist in this change. The
display is then filled by keyboard entry of the configuration
list ID, the item number of parameter ID and the ID of the
parameter to be changed. These are then displayed and changes
to parameter values can then be made.
B6.2.6 Data Controls Display
The crew has the capability to control the SM data
output to DACBU (downlist). This display is used to assist
in this control. The display is called by keyboard and changes
are made by item number in the same way as the other displays.
The downlist data options are identified in Section B5.2.
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APPENDIX C
ORIGINAL SM CONCEPT
A PERFORMANCE SPECIFICATION
Preface
This appendix contains the System descrip-
tion portion of Rockwell International Document
SD-72-SH-0103-8, Vol. 5-8, Requirements/
Definition Document, Performance Monitor dated
January 18, 1974.
The designation, Performance Monitor appears
throughout the document. This designation is
synonymous with System Management, which is the
newer designation.
The restriction that SM reside in computers
4 or 5 is no longer true. SM may reside in any
of the five computers, and under current design,
the C&W portion of FDA resides in all four C&W
computers.
The PMS annunciator electronics unit referred
to in Sections 5.2.1.1 and 5.2.2.1 no longer
exists.
SUBSYSTEM DEVELOPMENT MANUAL
5.0 SUBSYSTEM DEFINITION
5.1 Introduction
The Performance Monitor Subsystem (PMS) provides
an onboard capability for vehicle subsystem management
during both inflight and ground turnaround operations. The
primary PMS functions include: providing information to
the flight crew concerning vehicle subsystem health, per-
formance, and configuration status; recording the telemetry
format control to accumulate a subsystem performance record
of each flight; support for inflight consumables management;
payload support; cooperative support with the ground system
for turnaround maintenance and checkout. The secondary PMS
functions include: mission profile storage and retrieval;
performance evaluation and trend analysis; contingency
planning aid.
The PMS primary functions will be developed and
implemented for the first operational flight of the Shuttle
System. The secondary functions may be developed and utilized
subsequent to the first operational flight to the extent that
they can be accommodated within the basic growth capability
of the Data Processing and Software (DPS) subsystem.
The major functions provided by PMS are as
follows:
Primary Functions
* Fault Detection and Annunciation
* Subsystem Measurement Management
* Subsystem Configuration Management
* Consumables Management
* Data Recording Management
* Telemetry Format Selection
* Payload Support
Secondary Functions
* Mission Profile Storage and Retrieval
* Performance Evaluation and Trend Analysis
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* Contingency Planning Aid
These functions will be accomplished through the
use of hardware provided by other subsystems (primarily com-
puters and data processing, displays and controls, and
instrumentation). The unique portion of PMS is the software
loaded into computers 4 and 5 and the mass memories.
The inflight PMS functions operate in two basic
modes: continuous operation and on-demand operation. The
Fault Detection and Annunciation function, Data Recording
Management function, Telemetry Format Selection function, and
corresponding portions of the Payload Support function
operate continuously. All other PMS functions operate only
on demand.
With the exception of the Subsystem Measurement
Management function, the software used inflight is not ex-
pected to be directly usable for ground turnaround operations.
Separate software loads will be required for specific main-
tenance and/or ground checkout if these operations are
accomplished through the use of onboard computers (as opposed
to ground computers).
The PMS is one failure tolerant with respect to the
hardware used to accomplish its functions.
5.2 Subsystem Description
5.2.1 Functional Description
5.2.1.1 Mission Operations
The PMS primary and secondary functions are accom-
plished in Avionics Computers 4 or 5 through software programs
loaded into these computers specifically for this purpose.
Measurement data required to perform PMS functions are
acquired from the Data Acquisition Control and Buffer Unit
(DACBU). Output data, as a result of PMS processing, are
provided to the CRT's, the PMS annunciator electronics unit,
the DACBU, and the tape recorders. Control of PMS functions
is provided through the keyboards.
The mass memories are used to redundantly store the
PMS programs that normally reside in Computer 4/5. They are
also used to store subprograms and CRT display formats that
are used only when requested by the crew.
At any given time, the PMS program is operating
in either Computer 4 or 5. In the event of a failure, the
computer not in use for PMS is manually switched in to replace
the failed computer. Any program reloads from mass memory
(if required) are also accomplished manually.
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Provisions are included for control of the
command decoders during flight operations, whereby the
normal connection to the ground system is inhibited and
Computer 4/5 control is enabled. This allows closed loop
control of vehicle subsystems to the extent that parallel
switch control is implemented; however, this control link
will not be normally used for manned flights.
5.2.1.2 Ground Operations
Most of the hardware used for inflight PMS can also
be used for checkout during ground turnaround operations. The
inflight software is not expected to be directly applicable
since it is tailored to vehicle subsystem inflight operational
conditions that will not be duplicated on the ground. There
are two extremes that can be accommodated within the PMS
concept: (1) ground checkout can be accomplished entirely by
the ground system computers, displays, etc., with measurement
data provided from the DACBU and remote control exercised
through the command decoders; (2) the onboard computers can
be loaded with the ground checkout programs (through the
command decoders) and checkout operations conducted from the
cockpit using onboard CRT's for display and keyboards for
control. The amount of automatic closed loop checkout that
can be performed in either case will be limited by the extent
to which parallel switch control is implemented, and by the
interaction required with servicing type GSE (power, pres-
surant sources, etc.).
5.2.2 Major Component/Subsystem Description
5.2.2.1 Fault Detection & Annunciation (FDA)
The FDA function is implemented entirely in soft-
ware. The purpose of the function is to detect subsystem
failures at the functional path level (level at which
corrective action can be taken inflight) and inform the crew
that the failure has occurred. Measurement data are acquired
on a cyclic basis from the DACBU and stored in Computer 4/5
main memory. From these data, the subsystem configurations
for evaluation are determined and limits, tolerances, and
calculations required are enabled. Each subsystem is then
evaluated to determine if faults exist and the results are
stored in discrete form. The results are then filtered for
n consecutive occurrences of any given fault, where n 2.
If the n consecutive fault occurrences criterion
is met, an alarm indicator flag is stored for later processing.
If n consecutive faults do not occur the filter flag is reset.
Alarm inhibits for any given parameter (controlled by the
crew thru the keyboards or dedicated switches) are then ex-
amined and the output annunciator format is determined. The
output format consists of the following: a PMS Master Alarm
signal that is enabled whenever any parameter is detected
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out of limits (except when the parameter has been inhibited);
a backup Caution & Warning (C&W) Master Alarm signal that is
enabled whenever the failed parameter is a member of the
C&W subset; individual failure indications to the subsystem
level; a control signal for transferring prefailure data
from the loop to the maintenance recorder and to start the
maintenance recorder.
FDA provides a backup capability for the hardwired
C&W subsystem to alert the crew to any detected hazardous
or potentially hazardous conditions which require attention.
Backup C&W limits are identical to primary C&W limits and
are operative at all times when FDA is functioning.
5.2.2.2 Subsystem Measurement Management (SMM)
The SMM function is implemented entirely in soft-
ware. The purpose of the function is to provide the crew
with access to data from which the degree of a problem (de-
tected by FDA) can be assessed. PMS CRT display formats are
never forced; therefore, the crew must request all display
formats. The crewman enters the desired display on a key-
board. Computer 4/5 then generates the appropriate read
command to the mass memory. The static information in the
display format is transferred to the Display Electronics
Unit (DEU) and the variable portion plus appropriate link-
ages are transferred to the computer (straight "text" types
of CRT formats may not require direct computer involvement
since they have no variable portions).
When parametric data is required by the CRT format
it will be obtained from the same set used for FDA in
normalized form. It is then converted to engineering unit
thru a scaling and/or biasing process. FDA results are
obtained and used for generating out of tolerance indications
adjacent to the displayed parameter and are bidirectional
(hi, low). The output data is then formatted for transfer to
the DEU/CRT equipment. The process described above primarily
applies to alpha/numeric page type CRT formats when the re-
sult is typically a listing of related parameters by sub-
system. Other summary type pages are also provided, such as
failure summaries by functional path resulting from the FDA
process. There are additional CRT formats such as graphics
for consumables management and configuration management
displays that are described within other PMS functions.
5.2.2.3 Subsystem Configuration Management (SCM)
The SCM function is implemented entirely in soft-
ware. The purpose of the function is to provide an aid to
the crewman in determining the correctness of the vehicle
subsystems configuration at specific, predetermined points
in a mission. The SCM function is operative only when
called by the crewman thru the keyboards. It operates
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continuously when called and is terminated when any other
subroutine/display format is subsequently called by the
crewman. A request for the SCM function is recognized by
the computer and the required information is accessed from
mass memory in a manner analogous to that performed by the
SMM function. The parametric and discrete data required are
obtained from the same set used for FDA. These actual
status data (including both switch scan and subsystem
function status) are then compared with a preprogrammed de-
sired status map. Exceptions are then determined and stored
as comparison results. The results are then scanned and
English language statements defining these exceptions plus
corrective action required are formulated. This information
in then formatted for CRT display and transmitted to the
DEU/CRT. Optional provisions are included for linking the
results of an SCM subroutine with the command decoders where-
by differences in desired versus actual subsystem configurations
could be automatically corrected or altered within the limits
of the parallel switch control provisions. This option will
not be used during development or early operational manned
flights.
5.2.2.4 Consumables Management (CM)
The CM function is accomplished entirely in soft-
ware. The purpose of the function is to provide a crew aid
in establishing and evaluating the status of consumables and
their relationship to mission continuation. CM is accomplish-
ed for ECLSS, APU's, FUEL Cells, RCS, OMS, and EVA tankages
as a minimum. The final result for each type of consumable
is a graphic CRT display depicting nominal predicted con-
sumption, actual consumption, and minimum levels for safe
return (as a function of mission elapsed time). The CM
function is operative only when called by the crewman thru
the keyboard. A request for the CM function is recognized by
the computer and required information is accessed from mass
memory in a manner analogous to that performed by the SMM
function. The parametric data required are obtained from the
same set used for FDA. The current status data, consisting
essentially of quantities remaining, are processed to determine
total quantities (multiple tanks) remaining as a function of
mission elapsed time. This data point is added to a set of
data points stored in main memory that represents previous
usage calculations. All of the previously stored data points
plus the current point are then used to formulate the actual
usage curve. These data are then formatted and transmitted
to the DEU/CRT. The variable curve is then overlayed on the
fixed portion of the display to provide the crew with a
graphic representation of consumables usage.
5.2.2.5 Data Recording Management (DRM)
The DRM function is implemented in software. The
purpose of this function is twofold: (1) to record information
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prior to, during, and subsequent to a failure occurrence de-
tected by the FDA function; (2) to initiate "snapshot" re-
cording of significant subsystem data during dynamic periods
of flight. The DRM function generates a control signal to
transfer temporarily stored information (on the loop recorder)
to permanent storage (on the maintenance recorder). The same.
control signal is also used to start the maintenance recorder.
This action occurs whenever the FDA function detects an out
of tolerance condition. The run time for each detected
failure is programmable but will be constant at a total of
5 minutes (centered about the detected failure) for initial
flights.
The "snapshot" data will be recorded during all
dynamic flight phases such as ascent, rendezvous, reentry,
atmospheric flight, etc. In this mode the maintenance re-
corder will run continuously with no transfer required from
the loop recorder.
5.2.2.6 Telemetry Format Selection (TFS)
The TFS function is implemented in software. The
purpose of this function is to control the format of data
required for RF telemetry, onboard data recording, and the
ground system (during turnaround operations). The selected
format(s) is a programmable function of mission elapsed time,
GMT, mission phase or direct crew control. At least 4 unique
formats will be available for selection. All of the data
required for onboard processing by PMS will be available in
each format.
5.2.2.7 Payload Support (PS)
The PS function is implemented in software. The
purpose of the function is to provide the same generic PMS
functions that are provided for Shuttle vehicle subsystems,
including backup C&W. The PS function also includes a
capability to generate and transmit commands/data to the
payload at a rate of 2 kbps when selected and initiated by
the crewman thru the keyboard.
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